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Furst: Will the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Be Strike Three Agains

WILL THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT BE STRIKE THREE
AGAINST PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to a trial by an impartial jury' has played an extremely important

function throughout the history of American jurisprudence.2 The peremptory

1. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "trial by jury" to signify "a trial by jury as
understood and applied at common law, and includes all the essential elements as they were
recognized in this country and England when the Constitution was adopted. .. ." Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). The Court further stated that there are three essential elements
to a trial by jury. First, the jury should be composed of exactly 12 persons. Id. Second, the trial
should occur in the presence and under the supervision of a judge that has the power to instruct the
jurors "as to the law and advise them in respect of the facts .... " Id. Finally, the jury's "verdict
should be unanimous." Id. Although the Patton Court stated that a petit jury should consist of 12
persons, in subsequent decisions the Court has held that juries of less than 12 persons are
constitutional. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (holding that juries consisting of six
persons in federal civil cases are constitutional); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding
that six-person juries in state criminal trials are constitutional).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." Id.

See also U.S. CONST. amend. VII (guaranteeing the

right to trial by jury in specific types of civil cases); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-57
(1968) (reasoning that the jury has played a important role in the American justice system by
safeguarding the accused from the arbitrary use of power by a judge or prosecutor and by preventing
governmental oppression); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) ("the right
of trial by jury ranks very high in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards"); Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("Maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right
to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.'); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1879) ("The right of trial by jury . . . is a trial by the peers of every Englishman, and
is the grand bulwark of his liberties . .. .") (quoting Blackstone). Blackstone referred to the right
to a trial by jury as "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy or wish for, that
he not be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by unanimous consent of
twelve of his neighbors and equals." 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *387, quoted in JOHN J.
COUND ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASE AND MATERIALS 921 (6th ed. 1993). Although our
nation's founders disagreed about many aspects of government, they recognized that the right to a
trial by jury was a very pivotal aspect of a democracy. Alexander Hamilton stated:
[tlhe friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else,
concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference
between them, it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty,
the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), reprintedin THE FEDERALIST PAPERs 499 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
However, some commentators are critical of jury trials. One such critic was Judge Jerome
Frank of the Second Circuit. For Judge Frank's criticisms of jury trials, see JEROME FRANK, LAW
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challenge 3 provides litigants a means of obtaining the right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.4 Litigants are entitled to use peremptory challenges to remove
jurors that are perceived to be partial or biased against the parties.' Although

AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85 (1930).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "peremptory challenge" as "the
right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the
challenge."). The peremptory challenge should not be confused with a challenge "for cause." A
challenge for cause is "a request from a party to a judge that a certain prospective juror not be
allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes or reasons." Id. at 230. If it can
be shown that a prospective juror is partial, a challenge for cause permits the exclusion of the juror.
See Hoyt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887). The specific reasons that allow a juror to be removed for
cause are typically defined by statute. Most statutes allow a juror to be excused for cause when the
juror is related to a party in the litigation, if the juror has a special interest in the outcome of the
litigation, if the juror has served as a juror in a previous related or similar case, and if the juror
possesses a state of mind that prevents him or her from being able to serve as an objective trier of
fact. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1073-74 (West 1985).
4. Justice Harlan stated:
The right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the
most important of the rights secured to the accused . . . . [The defendant] may if he
chooses, peremptorily challenge 'on his own dislike, without showing cause.' He may
exercise that right without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously ....
Any system for the empaneling of a jury that presents [sic] or embarrasses the full
unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned.
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
Although Justice Harlan refers to the
peremptory challenge as a right, peremptories are not constitutionally required. See infra note 6.
The selection of a jury is a two-step process. First, a list of potential jurors is gathered
(typically jurors are taken from voter registration or tax assessment lists) and the jurors are brought
together. See COUND ET. AL., supra note 2, at 998-99. Prospective jurors are then selected at
random equal to the number of jurors that will actually hear and decide the case. Id. Second, the
prospective jurors are questioned by the litigants or a judge to determine if each juror can serve as
an impartial trier of fact. Id. The questioning of the prospective jurors is called "voir dire." Id.
The purpose of voir dire is to disclose prospective jurors' prejudices and biases that would
impede their ability to serve as an impartial trier of fact. The information gathered during the voir
dire process is used by the litigants when both peremptory and challenges for cause are exercised.
See United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 200 (10th Cir. 1980) ("The function of voir dire is to lay
the predicate for both the judge's and counsel's judgment about the qualifications and impartiality
of potential jurors.'). Depending on the jurisdiction, voir dire may be conducted by either the trial
court judge or the litigants. In federal cases, the trial court judge is given the discretion to choose
whom will conduct the voir dire. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a). For a discussion addressing the pros and
cons of allowing a trial court judge to conduct voir dire rather than the litigants, see infra notes 21923 and accompanying text.
S. Justice Byron White stated that "[tihe function of the [peremptory] challenge is not only to
eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom
they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise."
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). Blackstone stated that peremptory challenges were necessary in criminal cases "[because,
upon failure to establish a challenge for cause, the mere fact of challenging might awaken the
resentment of a juror; and to prevent ill consequences therefrom, a prisoner is permitted to
peremptorily challenge him."
SIR WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF
ENGLAND 711 (Win. Hardcastle Browne ed., 1897).
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the peremptory challenge plays an important role in the administration ofjustice,
its use is not a constitutional right6 and it is subject to constitutional limits.7
In recent years, the Supreme Court has held that peremptory challenges cannot
be exercised to remove a prospective juror from a petit jury' solely on the basis
of race9 or gender.'" However, the Court has yet to extend its previous
decisions to prohibit the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against
members of other cognizable groups." Until now, the use of peremptory
challenges has been limited according to the constitutional restraints of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.' 2 However, this Note

6. "[P]eremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the Constitution
.... . Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988) (citations omitted). "[Tihere is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress [or the States] to grant peremptory
challenges .... " Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Stilson v. United States,
250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)). The number of peremptory challenges varies depending on the
jurisdiction and often differs from civil to criminal proceedings. Under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, when an individual is charged with a felony the defendant is given 10
peremptory challenges and the government is entitled to six peremptories. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
In federal civil cases, both litigants are granted three peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. 1870 §

(1988).
7. See infra notes 36-76 and accompanying text.
BLACK'S LAW
"
8. "The ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action ....
DIcTIONARY 856 (6th ed. 1990). The petit jury is the final group of individuals that will hear and
decide a cause of action. The venire, on the otherhand, is "[tihe group of citizens from whom a
juror is chosen in a given case." Id. at 1556. A venireperson "is a member of a panel of jurors;
a prospective juror." Id.
9. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to eliminate jurors solely on the basis of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that a civil litigant's
discriminatory use of race-based peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant's use of
peremptories to remove jurors because of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause). For a
further discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings regarding race and peremptory challenges, see
infra notes 26-68 and accompanying text.
10. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (holding that peremptories
exercised to remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of their gender violate the Equal
Protection Clause). For a further discussion of the Court's holding in J.E.B., see infra notes 69-74
and accompanying text.
11. Recently, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether it should forbid peremptory strikes
that are based solely upon a juror's religious affiliation. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994). For a further discussion of Davis, see infra notes 8894 and accompanying text.
12. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions that have limited the
exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, see infra notes 36-74 and
accompanying text.
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argues that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 3 (RFRA) provides a means
to restrict the discriminatory use of peremptories that are exercised to exclude
jurors solely on account of their religious affiliations. 4 When jurors are
excluded solely on the basis of their religious preference, their statutory rights
established by RFRA are violated.' 5
RFRA grants persons a statutory right to the free exercise of religion. 6
If a claim is filed under RFRA, government action that impinges upon religious
liberty will be subject to strict scrutiny review.' 7 To survive strict scrutiny
review, the government must justify its infringement upon a person's free
exercise of religion by a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored."8
Due to RFRA's strict scrutiny standard, RFRA, rather than the Free Exercise
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, provides a preferable and more accurate
means for protecting jurors while preventing the discriminatory use of religious13. 42 U.s.c. § 2000bb (Supp. V. 1993).
14. To avoid confusion, this note refers to jurors' religious affiliations, rather than their beliefs.
A venireperson's religious beliefs, unlike a juror's religious affiliation, often may prevent the juror
from acting as an impartial trier of fact. If it is shown that a juror's religious beliefs impair her
ability to act objectively, then the juror is not being excluded because of her religious preference,
but because she is not impartial. For example, when prospective jurors have religious convictions
that would impair them from voting to impose the death penalty in murder cases, without regard to
the evidence presented at trial, they are properly removed for cause. See Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
15. For a discussion of how jurors' rights under RFRA are sacrificed when they are
peremptorily removed from a jury because of religious affiliation, see infra notes 163-93 and
accompanying text.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (Supp. V. 1993).
RFRA was enacted by Congress in response to the Supreme Court's erosion of the traditional
protection that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment had afforded individuals. See S.
REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893.
Traditionally, under the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause, all governmental infringements
upon an individual's religious liberty were reviewed under strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny
review, government actions that burden the free exercise of religion are considered unconstitutional,
unless the government demonstrates that its action is the least restrictive means of advancing a
compelling governmental objective. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
However, in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held that
laws of general application that are facially neutral towards religion require only a rational
justification and do not need to meet the strict scrutiny standard, even if such laws burden the
exercise of religion. Id. at 893. RFRA responded to the Court's decision in Smith and was enacted
to restore the compelling interest test set forth in Supreme Court decisions prior to Smith. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (Supp. V. 1993); S. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898. If a cause of action is filed pursuant to RFRA, the
act guarantees that the strict scrutiny standard will be applied to all government action that infringes
upon an individual's free exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V. 1993).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
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based'9 peremptory challenges. Furthermore, a cause of action pursuant to
RFRA adequately protects jurors, without further eroding the peremptory
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.
This Note asserts that peremptory challenges used to exclude jurors because
of their religious affiliations violate jurors' free exercise rights defined by
RFRA, and such a violation creates a cause of action that can be used to
preclude religious-based peremptories. Section II of this Note reviews court
decisions dealing with peremptory challenges regarding race, gender, and
Section II primarily discusses Supreme Court decisions limiting
religion.'
race-based peremptory challenges. Nevertheless, these decisions are important
because they illustrate the Court's willingness to erode the traditional nature of
the peremptory challenge and emphasize the importance of a citizen's ability to
participate on a jury. Additionally, the material discussed in Section II provides
their rights
authority for who has standing to argue on behalf of jurors when
2
have been violated by the discriminatory use of peremptories. 1
Section III of this Note briefly discusses RFRA's legislative history.'
Section IV explains why a cause of action pursuant to RFRA is superior to other
potential causes of actions brought on behalf of jurors that have been removed
Section V outlines a
solely on the basis of their religious preference.'
proposed cause of action pursuant to RFRA and explains how litigants can argue
that RFRA forbids the use of peremptory challenges to strike members of the
venire solely on the basis of their religious affiliations. 4
II.

PEREMPTORIES REGARDING RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION

5

A. Peremptories Regarding Race and Gender
More than a century ago, in Strauder v. West Virginia,' the Supreme

19. When a religious-based peremptory challenge is referred to in this note, it signifies a
peremptory challenge that is used to exclude jurors on the sole account of their religious preference.
20. See infra notes 25-114 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 36-68 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 148-228 and accompanying text.
25. Although section II primarily focuses upon the use of peremptory challenges with respect
to race, this information is nonetheless relevant to peremptories exercised with respect to
religion. The background information discussed shows the Supreme Court's willingness to erode
the peremptory challenge and illustrates how important the Court considers a citizen's opportunity
to participate in the jury system. Furthermore, the case precedent provides authority that indicates
who has standing to argue on behalf of jurors that have been subjected to the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.

26. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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Court held that a state statute limiting jury service exclusively to white males
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 The
Strauder Court reasoned that a defendant does not have the right to "a petit jury
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race," but a defendant does
have the right to be tried by a jury that is selected in a non-discriminatory
manner.'
The Strauder Court recognized that limiting jury selection to only
white males not only violated a defendant's constitutional rights, but also harmed
the excluded jurors. 9 Thus, the Strauder decision laid the foundation for the
elimination of discrimination during jury selection.'
Subsequently, in Swain v. Alabama," the Supreme Court confronted the
issue of whether an African-American defendant was denied the equal protection
of the laws through the State's use of peremptory strikes excluding members of
his own race from the petit jury.32 The Court rejected the defendant's equal
protection claim, reasoning that the defendant had offered no proof beyond the
facts of his own case to illustrate the systematic exclusion of African-American
jurors.3" The Court reasoned that a presumption must exist in every case that

27. Id. at 305. In Strauder, an African-American was tried and convicted for murder by a jury
consisting of all white males. Id. at 304. The defendant argued that West Virginia's statute that
confined jury duty solely to white males violated the newly passed Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
28. Id. at 305. See also Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (reasoning that a defendant
has the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected according to non-discriminatory
means).
29. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. The Court reasoned:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all
right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color,
though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant
to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id.
However, the StrauderCourt continued to tolerate the exclusion of women from jury service,
holding that a state could confine jury service solely to men. Id. at 310. The Court reasoned that
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended only to prohibit racial discrimination, not gender
discrimination. Id.
30. Subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges have cited the Court's decision in Strauderas authority for its holdings. See J.E.B. v.
Alabama er rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 235153 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991); Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400, 402-04 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-90 (1986). For a further
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 36-74 and accompanying text.
31. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
32. 380 U.S. at 209-10.
33. Id. at 224-26. Despite evidence that no African-American had served on a petit jury in
criminal cases since approximately 1950, the Court held that the defendant failed to prove AfricanAmericans were systematically excluded from jury service. Id. at 206.
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the prosecution uses peremptory challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury.'
The Court further reasoned that this presumption could not be overcome by the
facts of a single case, even when a prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
exclude African-American jurors solely because of their race. 3"
In Batson v. Kentucky,' the Supreme Court was faced with the
opportunity to reconsider its holding in Swain. In Batson, the Court held that
a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude AfricanAmericans from a petitjury violated an African-American defendant's fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection of the laws.37 Relying on the Strauder
decision,' the Court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause safeguards a
defendant against the state's use of race-based peremptory challenges and entitles
a defendant to a jury chosen according to racially neutral criteria.3 9 The Court
also recognized that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the

34. Id. at 222.
35. Id. To justify its conclusion that race-based peremptories do not violate the Constitution,
the Swain Court relied upon the traditional understanding of peremptories. The Court noted the
historical importance that peremptory challenges had played in the United States and England. Id.
at 212-16. The Court further reasoned that any curtailment of the unrestrained exercise of the
peremptory challenge would severely impair its ability in securing an impartial jury. Id. at 219-23.
36. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, an African-American was charged with second-degree
burglary and possession of stolen goods. Id. at 82. During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his
peremptory challenges to remove all African-American prospective jurors from the venire. id. at
83. The defense objected and argued that race-based peremptory challenges violated the defendant's
right to a jury trial taken from a fair cross section of the community, pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment, and violated the defendant's equal protection rights established by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The trial court judge denied defense counsel's motion that the jury should be
discharged due to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id. The jury, consisting of no
African-Americans, found the defendant guilty on both charges. Id.
37. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
38. For a discussion of the Court's decision in Strauder, see supra notes 26-29 and
accompanying text.
In Batson, the Court noted that although the Strauderdecision invalidated a state statute that
excluded African-Americans from jury duty, the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits racial
discrimination during the selection of a petit jury. Batson, 476 U.S. at 88. "Since the Fourteenth
Amendment protects an accused throughout the [court] proceedings bringing him to justice . . . the
State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination
at 'other stages in the selection process.'" Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562
(1953)).
39. Id. at 85-86. The Court noted that "[plurposeful racial discrimination in selection of the
venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial
by jury is intended to secure." Id. at 86. The Court reasoned that although prior Court decisions
primarily dealt "with discrimination during the selection of the venire, the principles announced there
also forbid discrimination on account of race in selection of the petit jury." Id. at 88. The Court
further reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the defendant throughout the entire trial
proceedings. Id. The Court emphasized that a state's use of peremptory challenges is subject to the
limits imposed by the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 89.
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excluded juror and the entire community.' The Court noted that "[a] person's
race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror' [and] by denying a person
participation in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally
discriminate[s] against the excluded juror."' The Court further reasoned that
exclusionary jury selection procedures aimed at African-Americans undermine
society's confidence in the fairness of the judicial system. 42 The Batson
Court's holding was significant because it allowed defendants to raise an equal
protection challenge to the use of peremptory strikes at their own trial. 3 Thus,
defendants would no longer have to rely on evidence of discrimination beyond

40. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986).
41. Id. at 87 (quoting Theil v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
All state action that discriminates against a person must be tested against the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that all persons have the "right
to equal treatment" and the "right to treatment as an equal." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1437-38 (2d. ed. 1988). When race-based peremptory challenges are
exercised, the Equal Protection Clause is violated because the state subjects jurors to disparate
treatment solely on the basis of the jurors' race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. Jurors are denied
their right to equal protection because the "government classifies... between persons who should
be regarded as similarly situated . . . ." TRIBE, supra, at 1438.

The level of scrutiny that state action will undergo when it classifies individuals so as to treat
them differently varies depending upon the nature of the classification. See Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (describing levels of scrutiny for classifications).
Racial classifications are inherently suspect and undergo the strict scrutiny review. See Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969) ("Because the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of meaningful and unjustified official distinctions based on race ... racial classifications
are 'constitutionally suspect,' . . . and subject to the 'most rigid of scrutiny' . . . . They 'bear a far
heavier burden of justification' than other classifications . . . ."); Korematsu v. United States, 323

U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AllI legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
A racial classification will survive the strict scrutiny test if it meets two requirements: the
government's interest in such a classification must be compelling, and the classification must be
narrowly tailored to fulfill the government's objective. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33
(1984) ("[Racial] classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional
muster, they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . .
to the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose .... "). Under the strict scrutiny standard of
review, reasonable or rational justifications for the racial classifications will not suffice. Racial
classifications rarely serve any governmental interest because the right to equal protection does not
depend upon irrelevant classifications such as a person's race.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 294 (1972). "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
Discrimination based upon racial classifications is "inherently arbitrary and
unreasonable, and it does not change the result that the racial classification is used to accomplish
what might otherwise be a compelling governmental interest." SCHWARTZ, supra, at 294. Although
the peremptory challenge is a means to secure the government's compelling interest in an impartial
jury, race-based peremptories are unconstitutional because a juror's race is unrelated to her ability
to serve as an impartial trier of fact. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
42. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
43. Id. at 96.
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the facts of their own case.
Contrary to the holding in Swain, the Court in Batson rejected the
evidentiary formulation of a pattern of systematic exclusion as "inconsistent with
standards that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case
under the Equal Protection Clause."'4 The Court noted the practical difficulty
that defendants had in attempting to prove discrimination by applying the rigid
evidentiary standard established in Swain.4 5 The Court replaced the systematic
exclusion test with a case-by-case analysis of whether or not a defendant's equal
protection claim was valid. 4'
First, a defendant attempting to invoke the Equal Protection Clause to
challenge the prosecutor's exercise of its peremptories "must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group" 47 and must make a prima facie showing

44. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986).
45. Id. at 92-93. "Since this interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a crippling
burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional
scrutiny." Id. The Fifth Circuit described the systematic exclusion burden to be "most difficult,"
and noted that before a defendant could meet the standard, the defendant would need to investigate
several cases and record the defendant's race and the racial composition of the jury pool and the petit
jury, and then analyze how each party used their peremptory strikes. Id. at 93 n.17 (citing United
States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971)). "American courts only decided three
cases in favor of a defendant under the Swain [systematic exclusion] rule." J. Christopher Peters,
Note, Georgia v. McCollum: It's Strike Three for Peremptory Challenges, But is it the Bottom of
the lnth? 53 LA. L. REv. 1723, 1729 n.30 (1993). "In light of Louisiana's discriminatory
history, it is not surprising that all of these cases originated in this state. See, e.g., United States
v. MeDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979);
State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979)." Id. The Swain "systematic exclusion" test has
been referred to as a practically impossible barrier for a criminal defendant to overcome when
attempting to prove that the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT To
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 156 (1977).
46. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
47. Id. The Batson Court did not define what comprises a cognizable racial group. Id.
Instead, the Court borrowed the term from Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. In Castaneda, the Court reasoned that a cognizable group "is one that is
a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as
applied." Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494. Various factors are used to determine if a group is
cognizable. Generally, a "group's population should be large enough that the general community
recognizes it as an identifiable group in the community [and] the group should be distinguished from
the larger community by an internal cohesiveness of attitudes, ideas, or experiences that may not be
adequately represented by other segments of society." Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780-81 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
A substantial amount of litigation has surrounded the issue of what constitutes a cognizable
group for Batson protection. Lower courts have applied Batson's cognizable group requirement to
a multitude of various ethnic groups. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that Italian-Americans compose a cognizable group), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th
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that the prosecution used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors of the
defendant's race.' Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, then the
state must give a race-neutral explanation for removing the prospective juror.49
Finally, the trial court will then decide who has prevailed in meeting their
respective burdens and rule on the appropriate remedy.50
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson, although very important,5 left
many unanswered questions concerning the future use of peremptory
challenges.52 However, the Supreme Court soon answered some of the

Cir. 1987) (holding that Native Americans constitute a cognizable group); Bueno-Hemandez v.
State, 724 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1986) (holding that Mexican nationals compose a distinct ethnic
group), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987); Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that Jewish venirepersons are a cognizable group); Kline v. State, 737 S.W.2d 895,
899 (r'ex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Asians constitute a cognizable group).
48. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). A defendant establishes a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing, from the totality of circumstances and facts surrounding his or her
particular case, that the prosecution has exercised the use of peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory fashion. Id. at 93-95.
49. Id. at 97. The Court emphasized that the prosecution was not required to explain its use
of the peremptory challenge to the level needed to justify a challenge for cause. Id. However, the
Court stipulated that the State could not rebut the defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination
by simply stating that the jurors were excluded on the belief that they would be more sympathetic
to the defendant because they share the same race. Id. See also Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting) (reasoning that an Individual's race is entirely
unrelated to his or her ability to serve as an impartial juror). But see Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Slecuring representation of the defendant's
race on the jury may help overcome racial bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of
having a fair trial.").
50. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98.
51. Many commentators feel that the Court's holding in Batson did not go far enough, and have
argued that elimination of peremptory challenges is the only sure means to end discrimination during
jury selection. Concurring in Batson, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated, "I applaud the Court's
holding that the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection
Clause .... [H]owever, only by banning peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended."
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall felt that
the prima facie standard articulated by the majority placed too much of a burden on the defense.
Id. at 105. Justice Marshall argued that the prima facie standard still allowed the prosecution to
discriminate against African-Americans up to an "acceptable level." Id. For additional commentary
calling for the elimination of peremptory challenges, see, Judge Raymond J. Broderick, Why the
Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 369 (1992); Jere W. Morehead,
When a Peremptory Challenge isno Longer Peremptory: Batson 's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate
Invidious Discrimination From Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 625 (1994); Karen M. Bray,
Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV.
517 (1992); Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 1026 (1987); Peters, supra note 45, at 1723.
52. In 1991, the Supreme Court extended Batson's holding to protect Latinos from the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
In Hernandez, the Court examined the State's race-neutral explanation pursuant to a Batson challenge
after the State had peremptorily challenged two Latino jurors. Id. at 1866. The prosecutor
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questions by extending the Batson Court's reasoning regarding peremptories.53
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions used Batson to justify holdings to conclude
that a white criminal defendant has standing to argue on behalf of an excluded
African-American juror,' that civil litigants are prohibited from exercising
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, 55 and that gender-based
peremptory challenges are also unconstitutional.56
In 1991, the Court, in Powers v. Ohio,5 7 considered whether a white

explained that the "demeanor of the two individuals during voir dire caused him to doubt their ability
to defer to the official translation of Spanish-language testimony." Id. at 1867. The defense argued
that the ability to speak Spanish was so closely related to ethnicity that the prosecutor's explanation
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was merely a pretext for actual discrimination. Id.
at 1866. However, the trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation as a sufficient race-neutral
justification. Id. at 1868. Although the Supreme Court held that Batson protects Latinos, the Court
reviewed the trial court judge's decision with great deference and concluded that no clear error was
committed "in choosing to believe the reasons given by the prosecutor." Id. at 1873.
53. For a further discussion of decisions that have extended Batson's holding, see infra notes
57-74 and accompanying text.
Although the Court's reasoning in Batson was soon extended and further eroded the
peremptory challenge in an effort to prevent discrimination, the Court rejected an attempt to
invalidate the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges pursuant to the fair cross section of the
Sixth Amendment. In Batson, the Court rested its decision entirely upon the Equal Protection
Clause. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). The Batson Court avoided the fair cross
section issue by stating that it had "never held that the Sixth Amendment requires that 'petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population.'" Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
Four years after the Batson decision, the Court reaffirmed its decision and held that the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges does not violate the Sixth Amendment's fair cross
section requirement. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990). In Holland, a white criminal
defendant objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges that removed two AfricanAmerican venire members from the petit jury. Id. at 475. The defendant argued that the race-based
peremptories violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial comprised ofjurors taken from a fair
cross section of the community. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's
requirement of a fair cross section did not apply to petit juries, and therefore, the defendant's claim
was without merit. Id. at 478. In Holland, the Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's fair
cross section requirement "on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the
Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it [the Constitution] does)." Id. at 480.
The Court stated that although petit jurors must be taken from a representative cross section of the
community, a defendant does not have the right to be tried by a petit jury that mirrors the
community at large. Id. at 482-83. The Court further noted that if the Sixth Amendment's fair
cross section requirement was extended to preclude raced-based peremptory challenges, the
peremptory challenge would be virtually eliminated. Id. at 484.
54. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). For a further discussion of Powers, see infra
notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
55. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). For a further discussion of
Edmonson, see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
56. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). For a further discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B., see infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
57. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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criminal defendant had standing to object to the exclusion of prospective
African-American jurors.' The Court held that jurors' equal protection rights
are violated when the State excludes otherwise qualified jurors because of their
race and that a defendant need not share the same race as the excluded juror to
assert an equal protection claim on the jurors' behalf.59 The Court reasoned
that the defendant and excluded jurors have an interest in eliminating
discrimination during jury selection, because the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges casts doubt on the objectivity of the judicial system and
offends society.'m The Court further reasoned that a substantial nexus exists

58. Id. at 403. In Powers, the defendant was charged with one count of attempted aggravated
murder and two counts of aggravated murder. Id. The State used seven of its nine peremptory
challenges to remove African-Americans from the venire. Id. The defense objected to the State's
use of race-based peremptory challenges and argued that the State should justify its peremptories
pursuant to Batson's race-neutral standard. Id.
59. Id. at 406-08. In Powers, the State argued that Batson did not apply because the defendant
was white and not an African-American like the defendant in Batson. Id. at 406. However, the
Supreme Court rejected such a limited interpretation of Batson and reasoned that Batson was
intended "to serve multiple ends." Id. (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986)).
60. Id. at 411-13. The Court stated:
A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge is
a constitutional violation committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings. The
overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of
the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of
the case.
Id. at 412.
A very critical element of the Court's decision was its reasoning that a criminal defendant has
standing to raise the equal protection rights of excluded jurors. Id. at 411.
Three basic
requirements must be met before a litigant may argue on behalf of a third party. Id. First, the
litigant must have suffered an "injury-in-fact" giving the litigant an interest in the outcome of the
dispute. Id. Second, the litigant must demonstrate that he or she has a close relation to the third
party, such that the litigant will be a sufficient advocate for the third party's rights. Id. Finally,
the litigant must show that the third party's ability to protect his or her rights is frustrated. Id. The
Powers Court found that the defendant had met these three requisite requirements.
The Court reasoned that the first requirement for third party standing was satisfied because
the race-based peremptory challenge "causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury, and the
defendant has a concrete interest in challenging the practice." Id. The Court emphasized that racial
discrimination harms the defendant because it sacrifices the fairness that a trial by jury is intended
to secure. Id. at 411-12. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) ("[Al defendant
does have a right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory
criteria."). The second element for third-party standing was satisfied because the excluded juror and
the defendant both may lose confidence in the judicial system if patent racial discrimination is
allowed to occur. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414. The Court noted that the defendant would further be
an effective advocate for the excluded juror. Id. The Court stated that the defendant "has much at
stake in proving that his jury was improperly constituted due to an equal protection violation, for
we have recognized that discrimination in the jury selection process may lead to the reversal of a
conviction." Id. at 414. Finally, the Court emphasized that substantial barriers exist which deter
excluded jurors from asserting their own rights. The Court noted that since jurors are not parties
to the case before the court, they have no opportunity to raise their rights when they are removed.
Id. The Court further noted that little incentive exists for jurors to vindicate their own rights due
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between a defendant and the excluded juror such that the third party will serve
as a sufficient advocate for the excluded juror's rights."' The Court recognized
that "with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of
jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic
process." 6 2
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,' the Court extended the
principles established in Batson and Powers further and held that civil litigants
were prohibited from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges.'
The Court emphasized that "racial discrimination has no place
in the courtroom" and the harm that the excluded venireperson experiences is
the same, whether in a civil or criminal case.'
The Court noted that when
race is the only reason for challenging an individual, the esteem and privilege
of participating in the judicial system is denied.'
In 1992, the Court once again was given the opportunity to extend its
previous rulings to further erode the peremptory challenge. In Georgia v.

to the large financial costs of subsequent litigation. Id.
61. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991).
62. Id. at 407. Alexis De Tocqueville referred to the jury as an institution that "'raises the
people itself, or at least a class of citizens, to the bench of judicial authority [and] invests the people,
or that class of citizens, with the direction of society.'" ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 334 (Schocken 1st ed. 1961) (cited in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).
See also VAN DYKE, supra note 45, at 1 ("The jury is the most democratic of our institutions. The
idea itself-that ordinary citizens without experience in judicial decision-making should be impaneled
to decide issues of great importance-is an unusual one in the world today.").
63. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). In Edmonson, the plaintiff, an African-American construction
worker, was injured while he was working at a job-site. Id. at 2079. The plaintiff sued Leesville
Concrete Company for negligence in a federal district court. Id. Pursuant to the Seventh
Amendment, the plaintiff chose to have a jury trial. Id. During voir dire, the defendant company
exercised two of its three peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans from the venire. Id.
The plaintiff objected to the defendant's race-based peremptory challenges and argued that Batson
mandated a race-neutral justification for the jurors' removal. Id. However, the district court refused
the plaintiff's request and reasoned that Batson did not apply to civil litigants because the Court's
holding in Batson had been limited to the criminal context. Id.
64. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
65. Id. The Court emphasized that race-based peremptory challenges cause greater harm and
are very severe because the discrimination occurs in a courtroom "where the law unfolds itself."
Id.
Since the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state actors, the Court's reasoning that civil
litigants can be classified as state actors was essential to the holding in Edmonson. The Court
reasoned that because peremptory challenges permit civil litigants to perform a traditional
governmental function, that of selecting a jury, and because peremptories have no use outside the
courtroom, private litigants qualify as state actors for the application of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 2080-83. See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (highlighting factors
to consider when determining if a private actor can properly be classified as a state actor).
66. Edmonson, I IIS. Ct. at 2082.
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McCullom,67 the Court held that a criminal defendant's discriminatory use of
Recently, in
peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause.'
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB. ,' the Court further eroded the peremptory
challenge by extending the principles established in Batson and its progeny to
prohibit litigants from exercising peremptories to exclude jurors solely because
of their gender. 7' The Court's decision in J.E.B. rested upon the intermediate

67. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). In McCollum, the defendants, who were white, were charged with
assaulting and battering two African-Americans. Id. at 2351. Prior to jury selecton, the
prosecution moved to preclude the defense from exercising race-based peremptory challenges and
argued that Batson was applicable to criminal defendants. Id. at 2351-52. The prosecution
contended that since 43 % of the county's population was African-American and since the defense
was allowed 20 peremptory challenges, the defense would statistically be able to strike all AfricanAmerican venire members. Id. at 2351. However, the trial court judge refused the prosecution's
motion, reasoning that Batson did not apply to criminal defendants. Id. at 2352. The Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's holding. Id.
68. Id. at 2351. The issue of whether criminal defendants should be subject to the Equal
Protection Clause was expressly left undecided by the Court in Batson. Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 89 n. 12 (1986). For further discussion of the Court's decision in McCollum, see Kimberly
D. Goodman, Comment, Constitutional Law - Criminal Defendant's Exercise of Peremptory
Challenges as State Actionfor Equal ProtectionPurposes - Georgia v. McCollum, 27 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 184 (1993) (arguing that the Court was incorrect for relying upon Edmonson as authority
for extending the protection of the Equal Protection Clause to include a criminal defendant's use of
peremptory challenges); J.L. Harvancik, Comment, Georgia v. McCollum: Eliminating The RaceBased Peremptory Challenge Once And For All, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 257 (1992); Michael M.
Raeber, Note, Toward an IntegratedRule ProhibitingAll Race-Based PeremptoryChallenges: Some
Considerationson Georgia v. McCollum, 26 GA. L. REv. 503 (1992).
69. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). In J.E.B., the respondent, the state of Alabama ex rel. T.B., filed
a civil paternity action alleging J.E.B. to be the father of T.B.'s child. Id. at 1421. When the case
was called for trial, the trial court proceeded to empanel 36 potential jurors, 24 females and 12
males. Id. The court excused two men for cause, leaving 24 females and 10 males from which to
choose a jury. Id. at 1421-22. Counsel for the state used nine of its 10 peremptory strikes to
eliminate male members of the venire, while the petitioner, J.E.B., used one peremptory strike to
excuse a male. Id. at 1422. As a result of the challenges, an all female jury was empaneled. Id.
Before the jury was empaneled, J.E.B. challenged the state's use of peremptory strikes to exclude
male jurors solely on the basis of their gender, claiming that the Supreme Court's reasoning
established in Batson, which forbids peremptory challenges to be made solely on the basis of one's
race, likewise prohibits purposeful discrimination on the basis of gender. Id.
70. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. Prior to the Court's decision in J.E.B., both federal circuit
courts and state courts were divided on the issue of extending Batson to gender-based peremptories.
For examples of cases that extended Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges, see United
States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990), affid, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane);
Laidler v. State, 627 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992) (relying upon the federal and state of Washington's Constitutions); People v.
Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). For examples of cases that declined to extend
Batson to preclude the discriminatory use of gender-based peremptories, see United States v.
Broussard, 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992); Hamilton v. United States, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d
662 (Neb. 1989); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987).
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scrutiny standard7 of the Equal Protection Clause, not the strict scrutiny
standard' that racial classifications must meet.'
The Court reasoned that
gender-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause, because
gender stereotypes, like racial stereotypes, are not an accurate justification for
removing jurors.74 Whether or not the Court will continue to erode the
peremptory challenge pursuant to the intermediate scrutiny or rational basis
standard75 of the Equal Protection Clause remains to be seen.76

71. The Supreme Court initially employed the conventional rational-basis test to decide the
constitutionality of state imposed gender classifications. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)
(reasoning that legislation differentiating between the sexes, in order to be constitutional, must rest
on some ground of difference that has a rational relation to the goal of the state action). However,
Justice Brennan and others pressed for the adoption of a more rigorous test that would afford gender
classifications increased constitutional protection. Justice Brennan argued that "throughout much
of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that
of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685
(1973).
Although the Court did not adopt a strict scrutiny standard, it did establish an intermediate or
heightened scrutiny test that gender classifications are measured against to determine if the
classifications are constitutional. Gender-based classifications will survive the intermediate scrutiny
test if they meet two requirements: the government's interest must be important, and the
classification must be substantially related to the fulfillment of the objective. See Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982) (reasoning that a gender classificationwill survive
the intermediate scrutiny standard if it is substantially related to a sufficiently important
governmental interest); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[Cllassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."). The Supreme Court has left open whether gender classifications are inherently
suspect. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct. 367, 373 (1993) ("[I]t remains an open question
whether 'classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect.'") (quoting Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
72. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review that racial classifications must meet
to be constitutional, see supra note 41.
73. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1424 (1994).
74. Id. at 1426-27. The Court applied the intermediate scrutiny standard afforded to gender
classifications and held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the discrimination in jury selection
on the basis of gender. Id. Since gender-based peremptory challenges are based upon gender
classifications and the State of Alabama acted on behalf of the petitioner, the Equal Protection Clause
was implicated when the state challenged jurors solely on the basis of gender. Id. In J.E.B., the
court noted how women, much like African-Americans, had historically been denied many of the
same rights. Id. at 1423-25. The Court noted that it did not matter whether women or racial
minorities had been discriminated against more severely, but only that "our Nation has had a long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. . . ." Id. at 1425 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)). The Court further reasoned that gender discrimination during jury
selection procedures, like racial discrimination, results in harm to the litigants, the community, and
the excluded venirepersons. Id. at 1427.
75. When the Court reviews state action or legislation according to the rational basis standard,
the state's action will survive so long as it is "reasonable." See TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1439-40.
When the Court applies the rational basis test, it gives great deference to state legislatures. Id. at
1440. Classifications subjected to the rational basis standard will be upheld so long as the
classification is reasonable in light of the state's intended purpose or goal. Id.
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The Court's continual erosion of the peremptory challenge raises questions
concerning the future existence of peremptories and casts doubt upon the
importance that peremptory strikes will play in securing a trial by an impartial
jury. Dissenting in J.E.B., Justice Scalia argued that the Court's restriction of
the peremptory challenge has harmed the true nature of the peremptory
challenge as a means to secure an impartial jury.'
Whether the Supreme
Court will prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against
members of other cognizable groups is not clear. However, the Supreme Court,
in its most recent opportunity to extend Batson, declined to hear a case in which
the issue was whether peremptory challenges exercised solely on the basis of a
juror's religious affiliation should be prohibited.'
Although the denial of
certiorari does not express the Court's opinion, part of the Court's reluctance
to address the issue may be due to the uncertainty surrounding jurors' religious
rights pursuant to RFRA. When jurors are peremptorily removed solely on the
basis of their religious affiliation, jurors' rights under RFRA are violated. 9
B. PeremptoriesRegarding Religious Affiliation
Few courts have addressed the issue of the discriminatory use of religiousbased peremptory challenges, even though some of the greatest advocates have
encouraged the removal of jurors solely on the basis of their religious
affiliation.' Nonetheless, when jurors are excluded from participation in jury

76. In J.E.B., the majority opinion, penned by Justice Blackmun, stated that parties could still
"exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any group or class of individuals
normally subject to 'rational basis' review." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429
(1994) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456 (1988)). In Cleburne, the Court held that a municipality's denial of a housing permit for
the operation of a home for mentally ill individuals was invalid under the rational basis test.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. By citing Cleburne, the J.E.B. Court seems to suggest that individuals
with disabilities may be peremptorily removed from'a petit jury so long as there is a rational basis
for their removal. For a furiher discussion of Batson's uncertain application to individuals with
disabilities and other groups, see infra notes 144-47.
77. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438. InJ.E.B., Justice Scalia stated:
[M]uch damage has been done. It has been done, first and foremost, to the peremptory
challenge system, which loses its whole character when (in order to defend against
"impermissible stereotyping" claims) "reasons" for strikes must be given .... And
damage has been done, secondarily, to the entire justice system, which will bear the
burden of the expanded quest for "reasoned peremptories" that the Court demands.
Id.
78. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
79. For a discussion of why religious-based peremptory challenges violate jurors' free exercise
rights, see infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
80. Clarence Darrow argued that a juror's religious affiliation was an important factor to
consider when selecting a juror. Darrow stated:
Ifa Presbyterian enters the jury box.., let him go. He is cold as the grave; he knows
right from wrong, although he seldom finds anything right. He believes in John Calvin
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service solely because of their religious affiliation, their rights are violate&'
and society should be concerned.'
Furthermore, because litigants may no
longer use gender as a race-neutral explanation to Batson challenges,'
justifications based upon a prospective juror's religious affiliations will no doubt
become more frequent."

and eternal punishment. Get rid of him with the fewest possible words before he
contaminates the others . . . . If possible, the Baptists are more hopeless than the
Presbyterians. . . . [Y]ou do not want them on the jury, and the sooner they leave the
better. The Methodists are worth considering; they are nearer the soil. Their religious
emotions can be transmuted into love and charity. They are not half bad, even though
they will not take a drink . . . If chance sets you down between a Methodist and a
Baptist, you will move toward the Methodist to keep warm. Beware of the Lutherans
*

. . they are almost sure to convict....

He learns about sinning and punishing from

the preacher, and dares not doubt. A person who disobeys must be sent to Hell; he has
God's word for that. As to Unitarians, Universalists, Congregationalists, Jews and
other agnostics, don't ask them too may questions; keep them anyhow; especially Jews
and agnostics ....
I have never experimented much with Christian Scientists; they are
too serious for me.
Clarence Darrow, Selecting A Jury, ESQUIRE MAo. (1936), reprinted in JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL
ADVOCACY 170-71 (1975).

Jury selection manuals also encourage religious discrimination during jury selection
procedures. A manual formerly used to teach prosecutors in Dallas, Texas stated, "Ask veniremen
their religious preference. Jewish veniremen generally make poor State's jurors. Jews have a
history of oppression and generally empathize with the accused. Lutherans and Church of Christ
veniremen usually make good State's jurors." Jon Sparling, Jury Selection in a Criminal Case
(unpublished, undated) (lettering and headings omitted) (on file with the University of ChicagoLaw
Review), reprintedin Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 211 (1989).
Even if these stereotypes concerning prospective jurors are remotely tne, discrimination
against jurors solely on the basis of their religious preference violates jurors' rights. See infra notes
163-93 and accompanying text.
81. For a discussion regarding the violation of jurors' rights pursuant to RFRA when they are
removed from a jury solely on the basis of their religious affiliation, see infra notes 163-93 and
accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the harm that the society suffers when jurors are excluded on the sole
account of their religious preference, see infra note 200.
83. J.E.B. v. Alabama cx rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). For a further discussion of the
Court's decision in J.E.B., see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
84. If courts continue to allow the use of peremptores against jurors with religious affiliations,
the goals of Batson and J.E.B. may be hindered. Because religion, race and gender are overlapping
classifications, religion could be used as a pretext for unconstitutional racial or gender
discrimination. One of the motivating factors behind the Court's decision in J.E.B. to prohibit
gender-based peremptories was the concern that litigants could use gender as a means to get around
a Batson challenge. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994). Likewise,
attorneys can exploit religious-based peremptories as a loophole around race-neutral or genderneutral challenges. Many of the cases that have addressed the issue of religious-based peremptories
have arisen when a minority juror's religion is proffered as a race-neutral explanation. See State
v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (upholding an African-American man's religious preference
as a race-neutral justification), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); United States v. Clemmons,
892 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989) (permitting a minority juror's religious affiliation to serve as a race-
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The quest to end the discriminatory use of religious-based peremptory
challenges is not a recent innovation. Almost 150 years before Batson, English
scholars criticized religious-based peremptory challenges which were used to
remove Roman Catholics as jurors.8 5 Nevertheless, only one court has
extended the principle established in Batson and its progeny to prohibit the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against jurors on the sole account
of their religious affiliations. 6 Litigants and judges that have argued for the

neutral justification), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990); People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584 (111.
App. Ct. 1991) (allowing an African-American woman's practice of reading the Bible to serve as
a race-neutral explanation); Salazar v. State, 745 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding a
Hispanic woman's religious preference as a race-neutral justification for a peremptory challenge);
Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (permitting the religious preference of
an African-American man and woman to serve as a race-neutral justification for peremptories).
In fact, if peremptory challenges against jurors with religious affiliations are not prohibited,
large segments of the minority population will be denied their ability to participate in the judicial
system.
For example, Catholicism is a major characteristic among the Latino population.
Approximately 80 to 95 % of all Latinos are Roman Catholic. See Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New
York: Courts, Prosecutors,and the Fearof Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 18 & n.87 (1992).
Depending upon the size of the Latino population in a jurisdiction and the number of peremptory
challenges that litigants are given, if a court were to allow Catholicism to serve as a race-neutral
justification for peremptory challenges, many Latinos could be excluded from jury service. For
example, in a community where 25 % of the population is Latino and 75 % is white, a 12 personjury
would normally consist of three Latinos and nine whites. If the State was entitled to three
peremptory challenges, it could exclude all Latino jurors by offering their religion as a race-neutral
justification for their removal.
85. People v. Dent, 639 N.E.2d 1349, 1352 n.2 (11. App. Ct. 1994) (citing MARY HAYDEN
& GEORGE MOONAN, SHORT HISTORY OF IRISH PEOPLE 495 (1921)).
86. Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140 (Dec. 14, 1994) (en
bane). For a discussion of Casarez, see infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. The Fifth
Circuit implied in dicta that Batson prohibits religious-based peremptory challenges. See United
States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated in part, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.
1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993). Nevertheless, state courts may limit the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges pursuant to their own constitution. Prior to Batson,
the California Supreme Court decided to forbid peremptory challenges on religious grounds. People
v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the use of peremptory challenges to remove
prospective jurors solely on the basis of racial, ethnic, or religious grounds violates a criminal
defendant's right to a trial taken from a representative cross-section of the community under the
California Constitution). North Carolina's Constitution expressly forbids the exclusion of a juror
because of religion. "No person shall be excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color,
religion, or national origin." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26. The state of Hawaii also forbids litigants
from exercising peremptory challenges against individuals on the account of religion. HAW. REv.
STAT. § 612-2 (1985) ("A citizen shall not be excluded from jury service in this State on account
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status, or on account of a physical handicap
.... "). See also State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990) ("[IThe right to serve on a
jury is a privilege of citizenship, guaranteed by the constitution, and provided for by statute, and
that, under our Constitution, that right cannot be taken away for any of the prohibited bases of race,
religion, sex or ancestry.").
The constitutionality of religious-based peremptory challenges has been a recent topic among
commentators. See Benjamin Hoom Barton, Note, Religious-Based Peremptory Challenges After
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elimination of religious-based peremptories have asserted that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids their use."
In State v. Davis,' the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected an extension
of Batson to peremptory strikes based solely upon a prospective juror's religious
affiliation.8 In Davis, the prosecution used one of its peremptories to strike
When opposing counsel
an African-American man from the jury panel.'
asked for a race-neutral explanation pursuant to Batson,9 ' the prosecution
explained that she struck the juror because he was a Jehovah Witness.'e The

Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protectionand FirstAmendment Analysis,

94 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1995) (asserting that religious-based peremptories violate the equal
protection clause and the religious clause of the First Amendment); J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note,
Applying the Break. Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569 (1995) (arguing that
religious-based peremptory challenges are not unconstitutional); Angela J. Mason, Note,
Discrimination Based on ReligiousAffiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge's Coffin?,
29 GA. L. REV. 493 (1995) (asserting that religious-based peremptory challenges are
unconstitutional); Melissa Roth Triedman, Note, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Religion-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 99 (1995) (noting the inconsistent treatment

religious-based and race-based peremptories receive by the judiciary); Case Comment, Equal
Protection -- Jury Selection - Minnesota Supreme Court Holds that Peremptory Challenges Based

on Religion do not Violate Equal Protection, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1164 (1994) (asserting that
religious-based peremptory challenges violate the Free Exercise Clause).
87. See infra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
88. 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
89. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 770-71. See also People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 590 (11. App.
Ct. 1991) (upholding the removal of three prospective jurors because "the characteristic of religion
play[ed] a major role in their lives .. .
90. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768.
91. For a discussion regarding the race-neutral explanation for peremptory challenges, see supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
92. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
The prosecutor stated that she was familiar with the religious beliefs of Jehovah Witnesses and said:
I would never, if I had a preemptory [sic] challenge left . . .. fail to strike a Jahovah
[sic] Witness from my jury.. . . In my experience. . . that faith is very integral to
their daily life in many ways . . . . That was re-enforced at least three times a week
he [the juror] goes to church for separate meetings.. . . In my experience Jahovah [sic]
Witness[es] are reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow human beings in this
Court House.
Id.
However, the logic of the prosecutor's justification could equally apply to followers of various
religions. Believers in the teachings of Jesus Christ would certainly be subject to religious-based
peremptory challenges. For example, Jesus Christ stated, "Do not judge, or you too will be judged.
For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be
measured to you." Matthew 7:1-2 (New International Version). See also James 4:12 (New
International Version) ("There is only one Lawgiver and Judge .... But you-who are you to judge
your neighbor?"). These passages taken from the Bible could be used to exclude any juror that
confesses a belief in Biblical teachings. Unless and until it can be shown that a juror's religious
beliefs actually interfere with her ability to act as an impartial trier of fact, a juror should not be
excluded from jury service. When courts allow the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
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Supreme Court of Minnesota reasoned that religious discrimination, unlike racial
discrimination, "is not as prevalent, or flagrant, or historically ingrained in the
jury selection process" and therefore extending Batson was unnecessary. 93 The
court also relied upon the fact that up until its decision, the Supreme 94Court had
strictly limited the extension of Batson to only racial classifications.
Likewise, in United States v. Clemmons,9 5 the Third Circuit condoned
religious-based peremptory challenges.' In Clemmons, the prosecution used
a peremptory challenge to remove a minority juror.' When opposing counsel
objected and argued for a race-neutral justification, the prosecutor stated that the
juror's appearance suggested that he was a Hindu. 9' The prosecutor further
to have feelings a good bit different from ours
stated that "'Hindus tend .
about all sorts of things. . [and the excluded juror] may have religious beliefs
that may affect his thinking.'"9 The three judge panel accepted the district
court's appraisal of the prosecutor's explanation as a sufficient race-neutral

against jurors with religious affiliations, it effectively condones religious discrimination. For a
comprehensive treatment of religious-based peremptories and why their use violates RFRA, see infra
notes 163-93 and accOmpanyingLext...
93. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771. The Supreme Court of Minnesota further stated, "To extend
Batson would complicate and erode the peremptory challenge procedure unnecessarily, and it would
not serve to remedy any long-standing injustice perpetrated by the court system against specific
individuals and classes, as Batson clearly does." Id.
94. Id. at 768. Although Minnesota's high court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had
recently granted certiorari to examine peremptory challenges with respect to gender bias, the court
continued to strictly apply Baison's rationale only to race. Id. However, shortly after the court's
decision in Davis, the Supreme Court extended Batson to also forbid litigants from using peremptory
challenges in a particular case solely on the basis of that person's gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Davis, Justice
Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia dissented, argued that after the Court's recent decision in J.E.B.,
[i]t is at least not obvious . . . why peremptory strikes based on religious affiliation
would survive equal protection analysis . . . . J.E.B. itself provided no rationale for
distinguishing between strikes exercised on the bias of various classifications that receive
heightened scrutiny . . . and the Supreme Court of Minnesota certainly did not develop
such a distinction.
Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994).
Justice Thomas further argued that the case should be remanded back to the Supreme Court
of Minnesota so the court could reconsider its holding in light of J.E.B. Id. at 2122.
95. 892 F.2d 1153 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
96. In Clemmons, the defendant was convicted for selling stolen United States Treasury Bonds
pursuant to federal law. Id. at 1154. On appeal, the defendant raised four issues, one of which was
that the prosecutor violated his equal protection rights as established by Batson. Id.
97. Id. at 1155.
98. Id. at 1156.
99. United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1156 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
927 (1990).
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justification."0
However, in Casarez v. State,'0 ' a Texas appellate court recently
extended Batson and held that the peremptory exclusion of jurors on the basis
of their religious affiliation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." In response to a Batson challenge, the prosecutor
asserted that two African-American jurors were removed on the basis of their
Pentecostal religion. 3 The court reasoned that religious classifications, like
racial classifications, must meet the strict scrutiny standard of the Equal
Protection Clause."° The court emphasized that religious discrimination was
very prevalent in early America.0 5 The court continued to reason that since
the right to free exercise of religion is a fundamental right,"° the Equal
Protection Clause is triggered when any governmental action interferes with

100. Id. at 1157. The Third Circuit upheld the district court's ruling even though the
prosecutor never asked the venireperson if he was a Hindu. Id. The court gave great deference to
the trial court's judgment and reasoned that it was not willing to rule that the prosecutor's
justification for the peremptory challenge was clearly erroneous. Id.
101. No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140 (Dec. 14, 1994) (en bane).
102. Id. at *36.
103. Id. at *2-3.
104. Id. at *32. The Casarez court stated that "[ailmost seventy years ago we recognized the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited discriminatory classifications based upon religion." Id. at *25
(citing Juarez v. State, 277 S.W. 1091 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925)). In Casarez, the Texas appellate
court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in J.E.B. The Casarez court reasoned
that the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. to prohibit gender-based peremptories allowed for the
application of Batson and its progeny to prohibit the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
against other classifications subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny review. Id. at *21 n. 11.
105. Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140, at *22 (Dec. 14, 1994)
(en bane). The court stated that "[o]ur democratic government arose from a period of severe
religious discrimination." Id. The court noted that many early colonists fled to America to avoid
religious discrimination in England. Id. The Casarez court framed itsanalysis very much like the
Supreme Court did in J.E.B. The Casarez court focused on religious discrimination in America,
just as the J.E.B. Court concentrated on the history of gender discrimination. See J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1423-25 (1994). The court continued to use J.E.B. as
authority for its decision, reasoning that since religious classifications are subject to strict scrutiny,
peremptories "exercised on the basis of religious affiliation is constitutionally indistinguishable from
a peremptory challenge exercised on the basis of race or sex." Casarez, No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex.
Crim. App. LEXIS 140, at *74 (Dec. 14, 1994) (en bane) (Meyers, J., dissenting) (explaining the
majorities' rationale).
106. Casarez, No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140, at *74 (Dec. 14, 1994) (en
bane) (Meyers, J., dissenting) (explaining the majorities' rationale). To justify its
conclusion that
the right to free exercise of religion is a fundamental right, the Casarez court cited Supreme Court
precedent and even relied upon RFRA. Id. at *25-29. Although the court relied upon the
jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA to conclude that the right to free exercise of
religion is a fundamental right, its reasoning that religious-based peremptory challenges are
unconstitutional was made pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at *32-34.
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one's right.' 07
After concluding that classifications based upon religion must meet the
Equal Protection Clause's strict scrutiny standard,"ra the court rejected the
State's argument that religious based peremptory challenges were justified by
g9vernment's interest in securing an impartial jury. t' 9 The Casarez court
acknowledged the importance of the peremptory challenge, but reasoned that
religion, like race or gender, does not serve as an accurate indicator of a juror's
ability to serve as an impartial trier of fact." 0
Although it is conceivable that peremptory challenges, when exercised
solely on the basis of an individual juror's religious faith, could be restricted
according to Batson and its progeny,"' a better and more accurate justification
for forbidding the discriminatory use of religious-based peremptories is found
within RFRA." 2 In Casarez, the court began to explore rights that jurors
have under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA but then justified its conclusion
to prohibit religious-based peremptories using Batson and its progeny." 3 The

107. The court's reasoning that the Equal Protection Clause is triggered when an individual's
right to free exercise is abridged was quite complex. The court reasoned that "[alt times the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment become fused with those guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment ....[The Supreme Court] 'itself has occasionally fused the First Amendment into the
Equal Protection Clause . . . but at least with the acknowledgement. . . that the First Amendment
underlies its analysis.'" Id. at *30 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544
(1992)). Although an individuals's First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights can become
fused, the court's reasoning is a good example of why a cause of action pursuant to RFRA is
superior. Unlike the Casarez reasoning, a cause of action pursuant to RFRA focuses solely upon
a juror's rights under RFRA. For a further discussion of a juror's statutory free exercise rights
under RFRA, see infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
108. The Court noted that the jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause mandates that when
a law burdens an individual's religious liberty, the government must justify the infringement with
a compelling government interest that is narrowly tailored. Id. at *30. See Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2233 (1993) ("A law that targets religious conduct
for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a
religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.").
109. Casarez v. State, No-1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140, at *32-34 (Dec. 14,
1994) (en bane).
110. Id. at *33. The Casarez court continued to follow the Supreme Court's approach in
Bauton and its progeny by reasoning that once a litigant makes a prima facie case showing religious
venirepersons were subject to discrimination, the burden shifts to the opposing party to articulate
a religious-neutral explanation for the challenge. Id. at *35.
111. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. See also State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767, 772-73 (Minn. 1993) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the purposeful discrimination during jury selection on the sole account of religious
affiliation).
112. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text.
113. Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140, at *31-37 (Dec. 14,
1994) (en bane).
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Casarez court took one step in the right direction by emphasizing jurors' free
exercise rights, but failed to entirely comprehend the protection that RFRA
affords jurors with religious affiliations. A cause of action pursuant to RFRA
not only adequately protects jurors that have been removed from a jury solely
on the basis of their religious affiliation, but it also gives courts a sound
statutory framework to work within, rather than the vague and uncertain
religious rights that jurors possess under the Equal Protection Clause." 4
111. AN OVERVIEW OF RFRA
On November 16, 1993, President Clinton signed RFRA into law." 5 The
act was supported by an extremely broad and diverse group of religious and civil
liberties organizations." 6 RFRA1 7 was a Congressional response" s to the

114. Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which can be used to protect religious liberty, RFRA
is a clear mandate that when the government burdens religious rights, it must justify the action with
a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V.
1993). For an analysis of why religious-based peremptory challenges violate a jurors' statutory
rights under RFRA, see infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
115. 139 CONG. REc. D1315 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
116. The following is a partial list of the organizations that were part of the Coalition for the
Free Exercise of Religion. Some of the coalition members included:
Agudath Israel of America; American Association of Christian Schools; American Civil
Liberties Union; American Conference of Religious Movements; American Humanist
Association; American Jewish Committee; American Jewish Congress; American
Muslim Council . . . Americans United for Separation of Church and State . . .
Association on American Indian Affairs; Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs
. . . Central Conference of American Rabbis; Christian Church (Disciples of Christ);
Christian College Coalition; Christian Legal Society; Christian Life Commission of the
Southern Baptist Convention. . . Church of the Brethren; Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints; Church of Scientology International . . . Concerned Women for
America... Episcopal Church; Evangelical Lutheran Church in America... Friends
Committee on National Legislation; General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists;
Guru Gobind Singh Foundation ... Japanese American Citizens League; Jesuit Social
Ministries, National Office; Justice Fellowship; Mennonite Central Committee U.S.;
NA'AMAT USA . .. National Council of Jewish Women . . . National Sikh Center;
Native American Church of North America; North America Council for Muslim Women
... Union of American Hebrew Congregations ... Unitarian Universalist Association
of Congregations ... United Methodist Church, Board of Church and Society ....
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpretingthe Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 73 TEx.
L. REv. 209, 210 n.9 (1994).
The bill also received support from both liberals and conservatives in Congress. In fact, the
bill that was ultimately signed into law was introduced by Senator Orin Hatch, a conservative
Republican from Utah, and Senator Edward Kennedy, a liberal Democrat from Massachusetts. S.
REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893.
117. Congress stated the following reasons and purposes for enacting RFRA:
(a) Findings. The Congress finds that(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as
an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
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Supreme Court's holding in Employment Division v. Smith." 9 In Smith, the
Court limited the protection that the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause"s' had traditionally afforded individuals.'
The Court held that
generally applicable laws that apply to all citizens regardless of their religious
beliefs only need to be justified by a rational basis, even though such laws may
infringe upon a person's religious beliefs or exercise thereof."2

Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely
as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justifications;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is
a workable test for striking a balance between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes. The purposes of this chapter are(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where the free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)-(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
118. "Mhe Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, responds to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith." S. REP.
No. 111, 103th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893.
119. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, two men were fired from theirjobs because they ingested
peyote, a drug, for religious purposes. Id. at 874. The men were members of the Native American
Church. Id. After the two men were discharged from their jobs, they sought unemployment
compensation. Id. However, they were denied benefits because they had been discharged pursuant
to Oregon law that prohibited the intentional possession of controlled substances. Id.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." Id. The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause
applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
121. For a discussion of traditional protection under the Free Exercise Clause, see infra note
123 and accompanying text.
122. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). The Court reasoned that
"[b]ecause respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that
prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny
respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug." Id.
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Prior to the Court's holding in Smith, laws, including laws of general
application, that substantially infringed upon an individual's free exercise rights
were required to advance a compelling governmental interest in a manner that
was the least restrictive in furthering that compelling interest. " The Court's
holding in Smith provoked a substantial amount of public outrage because the
Court disregarded precedent to reach its conclusion." RFRA, although it did
not overrule Smith, was a reaction to the Court's holding and established "a
statutory prohibition against government action substantially burdening the
exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability." l" The Act restored the compelling interest test that was
applied to free exercise cases prior to the Court's decision in Smith so long as
the cause of action is brought pursuant to RFRA, rather than under the Free
Exercise Clause. '"

123. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that a
state's denial of unemployment compensation to an employee who refused to work specific hours
because of sincerely held religious convictions failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard of the Free
Exercise Clause); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that
a state's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Jehovah's Witness that refused to
manufacture war weapons due to religious beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clause); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a state's interest in a uniform educational system does not
overcome Free Exercise Rights of the Amish who do not believe in sending their children to public
schools); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that there is no compelling state interest
in refusing to grant unemployment benefits to one who refused to work on Saturday due to religious
beliefs).
124. The public's disapproval of the Court's decision in the Smith case was exhibited by the
overwhelming social and political support that RFRA received. See supra note 116. Concurring
in Smith, Justice O'Connor was especially critical of the Court's decision to disregard precedent.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990). Criticizing the majority opinion,
O'Connor stated:
The Court today extracts from our long history of free exercise precedents the single
categorical rule that 'if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is . . . merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended'.. .. To reach this sweeping result, however, the
Court must not only give a strained reading of the First Amendment but must also
disregard our consistent application of free exercise doctrine to cases involving generally
applicable regulations that burden religious conduct.
Id. at 892. See also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and The Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990) (asserting the Court's decision in Smith was based upon limited
precedent).
125. S. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1892, 1893.
126. "The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 is intended to restore the compelling
interest test previously applicable to free exercise cases by requiring that government actions that
substantially burden the exercise of religion be demonstrated to be the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling governmental interest." S. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
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WHY A CAUSE OF ACTION PURSUANT TO RFRA

The jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause alone does not serve as
a sound basis to prevent litigants from exercising religious-based peremptory
challenges. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that generally applicable, facially
neutral laws that burden the exercise of religion only require a rational
justification and do not need to meet the strict scrutiny standard.'27 Thus,
after Smith, a generally applicable law, even if it burdens the free exercise of
Since peremptory
religion, will be sustained if it has a rational basis."2
challenges apply to all prospective jurors for any reason, peremptories are
analogous to facially neutral rules of general application."2 Therefore, if a
court was faced with the issue of whether to prohibit religious-based peremptory
challenges under the Free Exercise Clause, the court could reason that such
peremptories are justified as rational because the infringement upon the jurors'
rights flows from generally applicable government action that is facially neutral
towards religion. " Under the Free Exercise Clause, facially neutral laws of
general application only need to be justified by a rational basis, not the strict
scrutiny standard that RFRA mandates.'
Although the strict scrutiny standard is still applicable under the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Court in Smith attempted to limit its
application to the special context of employment cases. 3 2 However, Congress

127. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). For a further discussion of Smith,
see supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
It must be remembered that the Court's holding in Smith, although controversial, is still good
law for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Nevertheless, most religious
liberty litigation will probably occur under RFRA, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, because
RFRA mandates that all government action that impinges upon a person's religious liberty must
undergo strict scrutiny review. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (Supp. V. 1993).
128. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
129. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) ("In the quest for an impartial and
qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged
without cause."). See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1437 (1994) (Scalia,
J.,dissenting) ("all groups are subject to the peremptory challenge. .. ").
130. For a discussion why facially neutral laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, see
supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
131. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
If a cause of action was filed under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA on behalf of an
excluded juror, a court could reason that the juror's statutory rights under RFRA have been
violated while holding that the juror's traditional free exercise rights were not sacrificed. This
dichotomy of results indicates the importance of RFRA's strict scrutiny standard and the protection
that it affords individuals.
132. "We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test
except the denial of unemployment compensation. . . .In recent years we have abstained from
applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all." Smith, 494 U.S.
at 883.
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reaffirmed the strict scrutiny standard within RFRA by mandating that all
government action that impinges upon the free exercise rights of individuals can
only be sustained when the government demonstrates that the action is the least
3
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
Therefore, when religious-based peremptories are challenged under RFRA, the
state must justify its infringement upon a juror's free exercise rights with a
narrowly tailored compelling governmental interest.
In addition to providing adequate protection for jurors whose free exercise
rights have been sacrificed, RFRA also provides a sound statutory framework
within which a court can comfortably hold that religious-based peremptories
should be forbidden, while still preserving the function of peremptory
challenges. l'' As indicated by the Supreme Court's recent holding in J.E.B.,
135
some Justices are concerned about the future of the peremptory challenge.
Much of this concern stems from the Court's decision to prevent gender-based
peremptory challenges. While race classifications are subject to a strict scrutiny
standard,13 gender classifications are measured according to the intermediate
scrutiny standard. 37 Some Justices see no limit to the further erosion of the
peremptory challenge by encompassing all classifications
that are measured
3
according to the intermediate scrutiny standard. 1
However, because RFRA mandates that governmental infringements upon
religious liberty are subject to a strict scrutiny review, 39 a cause of action
pursuant to RFRA would allow a court to limit the discriminatory use of
religious-based peremptories without further eroding the peremptory challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause. By utilizing the statutory framework of
RFRA, a cause of action under RFRA is similar to the strict scrutiny review that

133. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
134. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
135. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (emphasizing the negative consequences of prohibiting gender-based peremptories
and asserting the future use of peremptory challenges as dubious).
136. Racial classifications are inherently suspect and undergo the most rigid form of scrutiny.
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). Racial classification will survive strict scrutiny if it
meets two requirements: the government's interest in classifying groups must be compelling and
the classification must be narrowly tailored in fulfilling the government's objective. For a further
discussion of the strict scrutiny standard in relation to racial classifications, see supra note 41.
137. For a discussion of the intermediate standard that gender classifications must meet, see
supra note 71.
138. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Court's holding to forbid gender-based peremptory challenges places
all peremptory challenges at risk, especially peremptories that are based upon classifications that are
subject to intermediate scrutiny).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
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Like the jurisprudence under the
racial classifications must meet." 4
Fourteenth Amendment which requires that racial classifications be assessed
according to strict scrutiny, RFRA mandates that infringements upon religious
liberty also be justified according to a strict scrutiny standard.1 4' Therefore,
if a court were to enjoin religious-based peremptories by reasoning according to
RFRA, and not the Equal Protection Clause, a court could avoid future
complications when it was faced with additional efforts to further erode
peremptories pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. RFRA only applies to
government action that impinges upon an individual's religious liberty. 42 The
Equal Protection Clause, however, can potentially prohibit the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges against any cognizable group. 43 For example,
courts could apply Batson's equal protection analysis to prevent the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against jurors on the basis of
physical disability,"'" age," 5 sexual orientation,"'c or classifications based

140. Racial classifications and governmental infringements upon religious liberty are
unconstitutional unless the government can show that the classification or its action is a narrowly
tailored means of securing a compelling governmental interest. "Just as we subject to the most
exacting scrutiny laws that make classification based on race . . . so too we strictly scrutinize
governmental classifications based on religion .... ." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
886 n.3 (1990). Justice O'Connor reasoned that the "freedom of religion, like freedom from race
discrimination . . . [is] a 'constitutional nor[m]'" and must undergo strict scrutiny review. Id. at
901 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 773 (Minn. 1993)
(Wahl, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Constitution forbids "purposeful discrimination in jury
selection on the basis of religious affiliation, since religious classifications, like racial ones, are
subject to strict scrutiny.").
141. Under RFRA, infringements upon an individual's free exercise rights will be sustained if
the government can demonstrate that its action is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
142. See S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1892, 1893-98.
143. Unlike a cause of action pursuant to Batson and its progeny, a cause of action under
RFRA does not require showing that religious-based peremptories were exercised against members
of a cognizable group. Instead, RFRA applies to any juror that is associated with a religious
affiliation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp V. 1993); S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893-95. Because proof of a cognizable group is
not a requirement under RFRA, a court does not have to decide difficult issues surrounding what
is a cognizable group. The issue of what composes a cognizable group became even more complex
when the Supreme Court applied Batson and its progeny to also prohibit gender-based peremptories.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Since a cognizable group for purposes
of challenging peremptories no longer applies only to racial classifications, litigants are free to argue
that other classes of persons comprise a cognizable group for purposes of limiting peremptory
challenges. For a discussion of what constitutes a cognizable group, see supra note 47.
144. Classifications based upon a physical or mental disability are reviewed under the rational
basis test. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). In Cleburne,
a municipality refused to grant a permit for the operation of a home for mentally challenged
individuals. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court subjected the municipality's action to a rational basis
standard and held that there was no legitimate reason for the city to deny the permit for the home.
Id. at 450. As previously noted, in J.E.B., the Supreme Court stated that peremptory challenges
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on legitimacy. 47

could still be exercised against persons who are members of a classification subjected to rational
review. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 (citing Cleburnev. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985)).
The Court's statement seems to suggest that individuals with disabilities can be
peremptorily removed from a jury so long as there is a reasonable explanation for their exclusion.
But see Thomas A. Hett, Batson v. Kentucky: Present Extensions and FutureApplications, 24 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 413, 433-36 (1993) (suggesting that the Americans with Disabilities Act may be used
as a means to prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges based on a individual's
disability).
145. The Court has consistently subjected age classifications to rational review.
See
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In Murgia, a Massachusetts
statute required state police officers to retire at the age of 50. The Court subjected the statute to a
rational basis standard and held that the statute was constitutional. Id. at 314. The intended purpose
of the statute was to maintain a physically fit police force. Id. at 314-15. The Court conceded that
although the State had not chosen the best means of accomplishing a physically fit police force, the
State had not violated "the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect." Id. at 316 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1971)). In
1991, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Murgia, holding that classifications based upon
age are not suspect and only require a rational justification. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991) (holding that a state's mandatory retirement age for judges did not violate the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act or the Equal Protection Clause). Furthermore, courts that have
faced the issue of whether to forbid age-based peremptory challenges have declined to extend
Batson. See United States v. Crests, 825 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that young adults do
not constitute a cognizable group for purposes of an equal protection challenge to the composition
of a petit jury), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 997 F.2d
491 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a juror's age, combined with her occupation and level of education,
were a sufficient race-neutral explanation pursuant to a Batson challenge); State v. Everett, 472
N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 1991) (holding that Batson does not prohibit the use of peremptory challenges
to exclude jurors solely on the basis of their age).
146. The rights of homosexuals are a controversial topic both in the political arena and within
the legal field. The Supreme Court has never held that the right to engage in a homosexual lifestyle
is a fundamental right or that homosexuals as a group deserve special protection. See Bowers v.
Harwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that homosexual activity is not a fundamental right protected
by substantive due process). The Ninth Circuit has held homosexuals do not constitute a suspect
or quasi-suspect class requiring strict or intermediate scrutiny. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990). In High Tech, the court reasoned that
although homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination, homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic, but a behavioral characteristic, and therefore, classifications based upon sexual
orientation only need a rational basis. Id. at 573-74. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning suggests that
peremptorily challenging homosexuals would withstand constitutional scrutiny because classifications
based upon sexual orientation only need a rational justification.
147. Classifications based on illegitimacy, like gender classifications, are subject to an
intermediate standard of review. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). In Clark, a unanimous
Court held that a state's six-year statute of limitations on paternity suits brought by illegitimate
children failed the intermediate scrutiny test under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 465. The
Court reasoned that distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children were "not substantially
related to [the state's important] interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims." Id.
at 464.
Recently, the Court held that gender-based peremptory challenges fail the intermediate scrutiny
test. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). If the Court were faced with the
discriminatory use of peremptories against illegitimate jurors, the Court could reason that the
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A PROPOSED CAUSE OF ACTION PURSUANT TO RFRA

The following Section discusses a cause of action for the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges based on religion and analyzes whether RFRA forbids
litigants from exercising religious-based peremptory challenges. The cause of
action discussed is intended to apply only when it has not been demonstrated
through voir dire that the jurors' religion would interfere with their ability to act
impartially."t
Although RFRA is a relatively new piece of legislation, a
considerable amount of case precedent has interpreted the statute. 49 However,
no court has used RFRA as a means to limit religious-based peremptory
challenges. Because RFRA expressly incorporates the jurisprudence of the Free
Exercise Clause,"5 much of the following information in this Section discusses
precedent that interprets the Free Exercise Clause as it bears on a potential cause
of action that could be brought when jurors are excluded solely on the basis of
their religious preference.
Before litigants can argue on behalf of an excluded juror, the litigants must
establish that they have standing to assert the rights of the juror. Once it is
shown that litigants have standing, a cause of action on a juror's behalf pursuant
to RFRA entails three elements. First, government action must breach a juror's

removal of illegitimate jurors, like the exclusion of jurors solely because of their gender, is not
substantially related to an important governmental interest and therefore is unconstitutional.
However, the Court has not been called upon to address this issue.
148. Generally, an otherwise competent venireperson is not disqualified as a juror because of
religious beliefs or affiliations. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 177 (1995). However, as previously
noted, sometimesjurors' religious beliefs may impede their ability to act impartially. See supra note
14.
149. Although RFRA was recently passed in 1993, state courts have been inconsistent in its
application to whether RFRA can be used as a defense to laws mandating that landlords not
discriminate against unmarried cohabitants. The tension is between a landlord's religious belief that
it is sinful for unmarried couples to live together and the statutory mandate preventing housing
discrimination against unmarried individuals. The issue essentially is whether the government has
a compelling interest in preventing housing discrimination against unmarried individuals sufficient
to override a landlord's religious belief that it is wrong to rent property to unmarried couples. The
Supreme Court of Alaska has held that a state's interest in preventing discrimination against
unmarried couples is compelling. See Swarmer v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274
(Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994). However, California courts have ruled that a state
does not have a compelling interest in preventing housing discrimination against unmarried couples.
See Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Donahuev. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Prior
to the passage of RFRA, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the State's interest in protecting
unmarried couples from housing discrimination does not outweigh a landlord's religious beliefs that
it is wrong to lease property to unmarried cohabitants. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (Minn.
1990).
150. RFRA states in pertinent part: "the term 'exercise of religion' means the exercise of
religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (Supp. V.
1993).
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Second, the government's action must substantially
rights under RFRA.'
interfere with the juror's free exercise rights.'52 Finally, once it is shown that
the government violated a juror's rights under RFRA, the government must
show that religious-based peremptory challenges are the least restrictive means
of securing an impartial jury.'53
A. Standing
The Supreme Court's holding in Batson and its progeny makes it clear that
litigants have standing to raise an equal protection claim on behalf of excluded
third-party jurors."
There is no reason why Batson and its progeny would
not also apply in situations where litigants argue on behalf of excluded jurors
whose free exercise rights have been infringed.'
It should be noted that
although RFRA permits individuals whose rights have been violated to directly
challenge governmental action,' 56 it is highly unlikely that a juror would raise
a claim on his or her own behalf.'57 Therefore, the remainder of this Note

151. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
154. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (reasoning that civil
litigants have standing to raise an excluded juror's equal protection rights); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991) (reasoning that criminal defendants have standing to assert the rights of jurors that
are excluded from jury service).
In general, litigants may raise the rights of third parties if three elements exist. The litigant
must demonstrate that he or she has suffered a concrete, redressable harm; that she or he has a close
relation to the third party; and that there exists some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect
his or her own rights. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83-86
(4th ed. 1991). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning why litigants have standing to
assert the rights of third party jurors that are subject to the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges, see supra note 60.
155. Clearly one's right to the free exercise of religion is just as critical as one's right to be free
from discrimination. In fact, government action that infringes upon an individual's religious liberty
is subject to strict review, just as government action that discriminates against individuals because
of their race is subject to strict scrutiny. See supra note 140.
156. RFRA expressly gives individuals whose rights have been violated standing to challenge
governmental action. RFRA states:
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may
assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate
relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section
shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III
of the Constitution.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (Supp. V. 1993).
157. The Supreme Court has emphasized that litigants should be allowed to argue on behalf of
jurors because "[t]he barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting." Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 414 (1991). As a practical matter, due to the large costs of litigation, little incentive
exists for jurors to assert their rights in a subsequent lawsuit after they have been subject to
discriminatory jury selection procedures. See supra note 60. See also Albert W. Alschuler, 7he
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 193-95 (1989) (noting the barriers that exist for jurors to protect their
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will refer to a cause of action pursuant to RFRA as being brought by a litigant
on the juror's behalf.
B. Government Action
A party challenging a peremptory challenge based on a juror's religious
preference must show that governmental action exists in order to trigger
protection under RFRA.
In RFRA, Congress intended to define
"government" 5 s and "government action"159 broadly.
Furthermore, the
6
Supreme Court has held that civil litigants" and criminal defendants 6'
qualify as state actors and are prohibited from exercising racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges. Given RFRA's broad definition of government and the
case precedent expanding the definition of state actors for purposes of limiting
the peremptory challenge, every time a peremptory challenge is exercised, state
action exists. Since all litigants, in either a civil or criminal setting, qualify as
state actors, potential protection under RFRA is triggered. 6 2
C. Religious-BasedPeremptory ChallengesViolate Jurors'FreeExercise Rights
Established by RFRA.
After establishing government action, a party arguing that discriminatory
use of peremptories violates RFRA must show that the exercise of such
challenges substantially burdens the excluded jurors' free exercise of
religion.'" A discussion of Supreme Court precedent will illustrate how
jurors' free exercise rights are sacrificed when they are excluded because of
religious affiliations.

rights when they are subject to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges). In fact, no case law

exists in which jurors have brought a cause of action on their own behalf, arguing that they were
unconstitutionally discriminated against when they were removed from the jury pool with a
peremptory challenge.
158. "[Ihe term 'government' includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and
official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of

a State...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (Supp. V. 1993).
159. "All governmental actions which have a substantial external impact on the practice of
religion would be subject to the restrictions in this bill." H.R. Doc. No. 103-88, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1993).
160. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that civil litigants
may not use peremptory challenges to racially discriminate against venirepersons). For a further
discussion of Edmonson, see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
161. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant's
exercise of race-based peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause). For a further
discussion of McCollum, see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion why a cause of action pursuant to RFRA forbids the use of religiousbased peremptory challenges, see infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
163. See 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1 (Supp V. 1993); S. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
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In McDaniel v. Paty,'" a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a
state's constitutional provision that barred ministers or priests from serving as
delegates to the state's constitutional convention violated the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.'" The Court reasoned that the Free Exercise
Clause forbids the government from inhibiting or rewarding religious
beliefs. 1"
The Court further reasoned that the statute was clearly
unconstitutional because it disqualified the plaintiff from participating in the
democratic process on the sole account that he was a minister.' 6 7
The Court's holding and reasoning in McDaniel help illustrate how
governmental action burdens jurors' exercise of religion when jurors are singled
out and removed from a petit jury because of their religious affiliations. When
jurors are struck solely because of their religious preference with no further

inquiry into their personal views, jurors' rights established under RFRA have
been violated by denying individuals a fundamental benefit of citizenship based
on nothing more than their religious affiliation.168 Like the disqualified
minister in McDaniel, jurors that are struck because of their religious faith are
denied a privilege of citizenship because of their religious status.'"
Therefore, religious-based peremptory challenges, like the statute in McDaniel,

164. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). In McDaniel, the petitioner was a Baptist minister that ran as a
candidate to be a representative in a Tennessee constitutional convention. Id. at 621. However,
Tennessee's Constitution disqualified all clergy or ministers from becoming legislators. Id.
Nevertheless, McDaniel was eventually elected to be a delegate to the convention. Id. After the
election, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that McDaniel's election was invalid because it violated
the state's constitution. Id. at 621-22. The Tennessee Supreme Court reasoned that the state's
interest in preventing the establishment of religion, transpiring from clergy involvement in politics,
justified the disqualification provision and outweighed any infringement upon McDaniel's free
exercise rights. Id. at 622.
165. Id. at 626, 630-33.
166. Id. at 626. The Court stated that "[tihe provision imposes a unique disability upon those
who exhibit a defined level of intensity of involvement in protected religious activity." Id. at 631.
167. Id. at 627.
168. For authority emphasizing that jury duty is a fundamental benefit of citizenship, see supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
169. In McDaniel, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[i]f the Tennessee disqualification provision
were viewed as depriving the clergy of a civil right solely because of their religious beliefs, our
inquiry would be at an end." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978). Although the majority
continued to reason that the provision offended the Free Exercise Clause because it conditioned the
opportunity for political participation on the relinquishing of one's beliefs and because the provision
was directed at acts and conduct performed by religious individuals, the Court's statement indicates
how strictly the Court will review government action that deprives persons of civil rights and
privileges because of their religious beliefs. Id. Like the Tennessee provision that disqualified
ministers from participating in the legislative process, peremptory challenges that remove jurors
because of their religious affiliations deny persons the full benefits of citizenship and must undergo
strict scrutiny review.
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penalize persons for the exercise of their religious beliefs." 7
In Sherbert v. Verner, 7' the Supreme Court held that a state's refusal to
give the plaintiff unemployment compensation benefits because she refused to
work on Saturday due to her religious beliefs"7 violated her rights established
under the Free Exercise Clause. 73 The Court reasoned that the government
violated the Free Exercise Clause because it forced the plaintiff to choose
between receiving benefits and following her religious beliefs. 74 The Court
stated that this choice placed "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise
,of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
75
worship."1

170. Penalizingjurors for exercising their religious beliefs by excluding them from juror service
may even fail a rational basis test. After the Court's decision in Smith, generally applicable
regulatory laws that infringe upon a person's religious liberty only need to be justified by a rational
basis. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Since peremptory challenges are
similar to facially neutral laws, if religious-based peremptories were challenged under the Free
Exercise Clause, such strikes would be considered valid if their use could be justified by a
reasonable explanation. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanyingtext. However, prejudices based
upon religious affiliations, like stereotypes concerning race and gender, are often an inaccurate and
unreasonable indicator of a juror's attitudes. For example, although the Catholic Church denounces
the use of artificial contraceptives, approximately 85 %of its members feel that it is permissible to
use artificial contraceptive devices. See Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 140, at *31 n.15 (Dec. 14, 1994) (en banc) (citing Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion
1993, 145 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1994)). Since religious stereotypes, like gender
and racial stereotypes, are often invalid, when religion alone is used to exclude jurors, the
government through its state actors presumes that certain jurors are unqualified "to decide important
questions upon which reasonable persons could disagree." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.
Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994). But see State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (asserting that
religious-based peremptory challenges do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because a juror's
religious affiliations are an accurate indicator of one's beliefs), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994);
Casarezv. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140, at *75 (Dec. 14, 1994) (en banc)
(Meyers, J., dissenting) (arguing that religious stereotypes are an accurate indicator of a juror's
beliefs and attitudes).
171. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
172. Id. The plaintiff, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was fired by her South Carolina employer
because she would not work on Saturday due to her religious convictions that Saturday is the
Sabbath Day. Id. After she was unable to find subsequent employment, the plaintiff filed a claim
for unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at 399-400. However, under South Carolina's
Unemployment Compensation Act, the Employment Security Commission declared her ineligible for
benefits because she refused "to accept 'suitable work when offered. .. by the employment office
or the employer. . . .'" Id. at 400 (quoting S.C. CODE. § 68-114(3) (1961)).
173. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410. See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that a state's refusal to give unemployment benefits to an employee who
refused to work specific hours because of religious beliefs violated the employee's free exercise
rights).
174. Sherber, 374 U.S. at 404.
175. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
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When courts allow religious-based peremptory challenges, prospective
jurors, like the plaintiff in Sherbert, are forced to admit their religious
affiliations if asked," and to either forfeit the privilege and opportunity to
serve as a juror or deny their religious faith as a prerequisite to jury service.
The Court, in Sherbert and McDaniel, clearly rejected the proposition that
sacrificing one's exercise of religion was a necessary precondition for eligibility
to participate in a state's political process.'" When peremptory challenges are
used to strike a juror because that juror is religious, that juror is in effect taxed
and excluded from participation in the judicial system because of his or her
religious faith.
Even though the infringement upon a juror's free exercise rights as
established under RFRA may only be indirectly restricted by the discriminatory
use of religious-based peremptory challenges, such an interference is
substantial." In McDaniel, Justice Brennan reasoned that because the state's

176. Some practitioner guides encourage lawyers to find out jurors' religious affiliations.
"Whenever possible, jurors should be questioned about their religion. Find out what denomination
and which church they belong to and whether they attend church regularly. Follow-up questions
should be designed to reveal the degree of the individual's involvement in church activities."
NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, INC., JURYWORK:

SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES, §17.03[2][f0 at 17-44

(Elissa Krauss & Beth Bonora eds., 2d. ed 1993). Legal scholars and jury selection manuals also
encourage litigants to find out a juror's religious preference. See supra note 80.
177. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
626 (1978).
In McDaniel, the Court stated that the disqualification provision violated the minister's free
exercise rights because it conditioned the opportunity for participation in the political process upon
the surrender of the minister's right to exercise his religion. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626. The Court
stated that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating,
prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs . . . ." Id. Justice Brennan emphasized that "[i]f [the
plaintiff] were to renounce his ministry, presumably he could regain eligibility for elective office,
but if he does not, he must forgo an opportunity for political participation he otherwise would
enjoy." Id. at 634 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, the Court held that
Maryland's refusal to commission the plaintiff as a notary public because he refused to declare his
belief in God violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 495. The Court reasoned that the offense
against the First Amendment lay not simply in requiring an oath, but in "limiting public offices to
persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of
religious concept." Id. at 494. The Court's holdings in McDaniel and Torcaso mandate that the
government may not condition the receipt of an opportunity to participate in the political process
without running afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. Likewise, the government cannot discriminate
against jurors solely because of their religious preference without violating their free exercise rights
pursuant to RFRA because it conditions the opportunity to participate in the judicial system upon
the sacrificing of one's faith.
178. In McDaniel, the State of Tennessee argued that its constitutional provision which barred
ministers from serving as delegates did not violate the petitioner's free exercise rights. McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 633 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). Tennessee argued that the
disqualification provision did not violate the rights of the petitioner because it did not directly
prohibit religious activity, but it only conditioned participation in the political process upon an
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constitution required the minister "to purchase his right" to exercise his religion
by forgoing his ability to serve as a delegate, it impaired his free exercise of
religion.179 Likewise, when a Catholic juror is struck from the jury pool by
a peremptory challenge, that juror is forced to buy the right to engage in
Catholicism by relinquishing her opportunity to participate in the judicial system
as a juror. This conditioning of benefits based upon one's religious faith not
only "chills" the free exercise of religion, but it substantially burdens the free
exercise of religion because jurors are penalized for the exercise of their
faith. 180
Furthermore, when Congress enacted RFRA it recognized that neutral
governmental action toward religion may burden religious exercise as much as
action that intends to interfere with religious exercise'
Although peremptory2
challenges are neutral in theory because they apply to all prospective jurors,'
when jurors are struck solely because of their religion, the peremptory challenge
is no longer neutral, but is clearly discriminatorily singling out and excluding

individual's decision to forgo his or her exercise of religion. Id. However, the Court unequivocally
rejected the State's argument and reasoned that government action which conditions benefits upon
the relinquishing of one's religious affiliation clearly runs afoul to the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at
626, 633. Even though the disqualification provision indirectly prohibited the free exercise of
religion, the Court reasoned that the disqualification provision was unconstitutional because it
penalized the petitioner's free exercise of his faith. Id. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (reasoning that a state's unemployment compensation law that disqualified a person for
refusing to work on Saturday violated the Free Exercise Clause because the State indirectly penalized
the individual for the exercise of her religious beliefs); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
(1961) ("If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is
to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect."). Likewise, although a juror is penalized
indirectly by state actors exercising peremptory challenges, peremptories that exclude jurors because
of their religious faith violate jurors' free exercise rights.
179. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 634 (Brennan, J., concurring).
180. In McDaniel, the Court reasoned that the disqualification provision was unconstitutional
not only because it discriminated against individuals that were religious, but also because the
provision unconstitutionally penalized the petitioner for exercising his faith. Id. at 618. See also
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961) (holding that a State's refusal to commission a
person as a notary public for his refusal to take an oath expressing belief in God violated the Free
Exercise Clause because the oath "limit[ed] public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more
properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept.").
181. RFRA states, in pertinent part: "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2)
(Supp. V. 1993). Congress further stressed that an individual's free exercise rights "may be
undermined not only by Government actions singling out religious activities for special burdens, but
also governmental rules of general application. . . ." S. REP. NO. 103-111, 103d Cong., IstSess.
1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1892, 1894. See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye
v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2250 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) ("'Neutral, generally applicable'
laws, drafted as they are from the perspective of the non-adherent, have the unavoidable potential
of putting the believer to a choice between God and government.").
182. See supra note 129.
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A discriminatory component exists within the

government's action because other "non-religious" prospective jurors are not
subject to this same treatment. "
In Everson v. Board of Education,'" the Court reasoned that the First
Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral [party] in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than
it is to favor them.""8 5 Others have also suggested that the two religion
clauses of the First Amendment, when read together, mandate that governmental
action remain entirely neutral towards religion. 18 6
When peremptory
challenges are exercised in a discriminatory fashion against venirepersons solely
on the basis of their religious preference, the government's action exercised
through the peremptory challenge is not neutral." 7
Rather, when the

183. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (reasoning that a State's constitutional
provision that prohibited clergymen from serving as legislators violated the Free Exercise Clause
because the State excluded persons from participation in the political process because they were
religious); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (reasoning that a State's denial of
unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday because
of religious beliefs had a discriminatory effect because persons who worshipped on Sunday were not
affected); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding that a State's refusal to
commission a person as a notary public because he refused to take an oath that he believed in God
violated the Free Exercise Clause because the State discriminated against him for not professing
particular religious beliefs); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (holding that a city
ordinance that was applied in a discriminatory fashion violated a religious group's free exercise
rights).
184. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
185. Id. at 18. See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 624 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (reasoning that benefits from state statutes should be "distributed in a neutral fashion
to religious and nonreligious applicants alike . . . ."); Welsh v United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372

(1970) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Nieither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is the goal of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment."); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305
(1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (reasoning that the relationship between the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause mandates government neutrality and prevents the government from
showing "favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion. . . .).
186. "[The [Free Exercise Clause and Establishment] clauses should be read as stating a single
precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these
clauses . . . prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden."

PHIuP KURLAND, RELIOON AND THE LAW 112 (1962).

187. Although venirepersons have no right to sit on a particular jury, they presumably have the
right not to be excluded from jury service solely on account of their religious preference. Cf. J.E.B.
v. Alabama er rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994) ("All persons, when granted the opportunity
to serve on a jury, have the right not to be excluded.., because of discriminatory and stereotypical
presumptions. . . ."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) ("An individual juror does not
have a right to sit on a particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded
from one on account of race."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) ("[B]y denying a
person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated
against the excluded juror.").
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government allows state actors to use religious-based peremptory challenges, it
implicitly sanctions hostility towards jurors professing religious beliefs.a
Hostility toward religion is entirely contrary to the intent of our nation's
founders who sought to establish a nation based upon the principle of religious
tolerance. ""

188. See generally Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility To Religion, American Style, 42
DEPAUL L. RE. 263 (1992) (discussing how the United States' judicial system has been hostile
towards religion).
189. In order to fully understand the Free Exercise Clause, it is helpful to know why religious
tolerance was important to the colonists. Although most of the founders were not particularly
religious individuals, "practically all were convinced that republican government rests on moral
values that spring ultimately from religion." A. James Reichley, Religion and the Constitution, in
RELIGION IN AMERICAN POLITICs 3, 4 (Charles W. Dunn ed., 1989). During the early stages of
settlement in the colonies, England discriminated against religions that were not associated with the
Anglican Church. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free
Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (1990). The Test Act of 1672 is one example
of the English intolerance towards many religious affiliations. The Test Act of 1672 restricted
military and public offices to Anglicans and required all those that held office to "swear an oath in
court denying transubstantiation and acknowledging the King's supremacy over the Church and to
present proof that they had taken communion within the preceding year in accordance with the rites
of the Church of England." Id. at 1421-22.
However, religious discrimination also occurred in the colonies. In New England, the Puritans
wanted to avoid association with anyone who objected to their religious beliefs. Id. at 1422. In
Massachusetts, Baptista were exiled by statute, "and four Quakers, who insisted on returning after
being expelled, were hanged." Id. at 1423. Nevertheless, religious tolerance and acceptance soon
became the basis for the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Maryland Assembly was
the first colony to incorporate the term "free exercise" into a statute that stated, "noe person...
professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee any waies troubled. . . for . . . his
or her religion nor in the free exercise thereof. . . nor any way [be] compelled to the beliefe or
exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent." Id. at 1425 (quoting Act Concerning
Religion of 1649, reprintedin 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 49, 50 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner
eds., 1987)). Some of the founders disagreed upon the terminology that would adequately protect
religious groups and affiliations. Some of the nation's founders advocated that the free exercise or
liberty of conscience should be used rather than the free exercise of religion. One anti-federalist
argued that "[t]he right of conscience shall be held inviolable; and neither the legislative, executive,
nor judicial powers of the United States shall have authority to alter, abrogate, or infringe any part
of the constitution of the several states, which provide for the preservation of liberty in matters of
religion." The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 237 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986).
However, the actual
difference between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion is irrelevant. Certainly, religious
tolerance was one foundationof the United States' Constitution. Pennsylvania'sConstitutionof 1776
is an example of a state's free exercise clause at the time of the creation and adoption of the United
States First Amendment and illustrates an early attempt to protect religious liberty. "[A]II men have
a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God ... nor can any man who acknowledges
the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his
religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious worship . . . ." PA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted
in STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 114 (1980).
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Whether jury service is a right, a privilege, or a duty does not matter in
determining whether a juror's rights as established by RFRA have been
sacrificed."1
As the Court reasoned in McDaniel, a state may not extend
benefits of citizenship to some while denying those same benefits to others
because of the latter's religious faith.' 9 ' Concurring in McDaniel, Justice
Brennan emphasized that the "government may not use religion as a basis of
classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits. ""9
Although exclusion from jury service is something that many jurors would
welcome, individual liberties, such as the free exercise of religion, should not
depend upon the willingness of others to enforce those rights. All persons value
rights, privileges, and freedoms differently. Although many citizens may not
aspire to serve on a jury, the Supreme Court has continually stressed that jury
service is a fundamental aspect of a democracy.193 When state actors exercise
religious-based peremptory challenges, jurors' free exercise rights are abridged
not only because they are disadvantaged for being religious, but because the
state conditions participation injury service upon the forgoing of one's religious
liberty.

190. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (reasoning that
regardless of whether jury service is a right, a privilege, or a duty, a State may not extend it to some
of its citizens and deny it to others on racial grounds).
191. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404 (1963). In responding to South Carolina's argument that its denial of unemployment
benefits to the plaintiff did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Court in Sherbert reasoned that
the State's unemployment statute could not be:
saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation
benefits are not appellant's 'right' but merely a 'privilege.' It is too late in the day to
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
192. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 639. See also PHILIP KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18
(1962) ("[Rleligion may not be used as abasis for classification for purposes of governmental action,
whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of duties or
obligations.").
193. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) ("Equal opportunity
to participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not
only furthers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of equality under the law .. .
."); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) ("[W]ith the exception of voting, for most citizens
the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the
democratic process."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[Jury Service] affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process of
government, an experience fostering, ones hopes, a respect for law."). For further authority
emphasizing that the opportunity to participate as a juror is a fundamental aspect of citizenship, see
supra note 62.
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D. The Government is Unable to Justify the Use of Religious-BasedPeremptory
Challenges.
Once a party establishes that the government has substantially interfered
with a juror's free exercise rights under RFRA, the burden then shifts to the
government or the party exercising the peremptory challenge.' 94 Like other
constitutional rights, jurors' free exercise rights are not absolute but must yield
to compelling governmental interests. In order for religious-based peremptories
to be upheld, the government must justify its infringement of the excluded
juror's rights with a compelling state interest that is implemented through the
least restrictive means available. 95
1. Government's Compelling Interest: An Impartial Jury
The government has a compelling interest to provide litigants with an
impartial jury of their peers, and the peremptory challenge is a means to secure
an impartial jury."9 However, the Supreme Court's repeated willingness to
erode the peremptory challenge calls into question the peremptory challenge's
very existence as a means of affording litigants an impartial jury trial."rc The
Court has stated that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally
guaranteed'" and are subject to the constitutional rights of both jurors and
litigants.'" Furthermore, if the peremptory challenge still may be deemed an
important aspect of the right to secure a trial by an impartial jury, the benefit
that occurs from exercising peremptories against jurors solely on the account of
their religious affiliation is surely outweighed by the harm to the juror, the

194. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
195. "Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(l) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
196. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 77.
Some studies have concluded that peremptory challenges are an ineffective means to secure
an impartial jury. See generally Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict An Experiment in a FederalDistrict Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491
(1978) (concluding that peremptory challenges have little to no affect on the outcome of jury
verdicts).
198. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
199. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant's use of
peremptories to remove jurors solely on the account of their race violates jurors' equal protection
rights); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the State's use of race-based
peremptory challenges breaches the equal protection rights of the defendant and the excluded juror).
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litigants, the community, and the judicial system.'
Nevertheless, assuming
the government's interest in permitting litigants to exercise religious-based
peremptory challenges can be termed "compelling," that interest must be
accomplished through the least restrictive means available."'
The
government's interest in providing litigants with an impartial jury, although a
very important interest, can be accomplished through a less restrictive means
other than allowing the use of religious-based peremptories.
2. A Less Restrictive Means: Liberalization of Voir Dire
In determining the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory challenges,
the J.E.B. Court stated that "we do not weigh the value of peremptory
challenges as an institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate
invidious discrimination from the courtroom. Instead, we consider whether
peremptory challenges based on gender stereotypes provide substantial aid to a
litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury."2=: Likewise, the
stereotypes underlying the use of religious-based peremptories must be
scrutinized when the constitutionality of such peremptories is questioned.
Stereotypes surrounding a juror's religious affiliation, like stereotypes

200. Jurors are harmed by religious-based peremptory challenges because their free exercise
rights are abridged and they are denied a fundamental benefit of citizenship on the sole account that
they are religious. For a more detailed discussion of how religious-based peremptories violate
jurors' rights, see supra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
The discriminatory use of religious-based peremptories harms the litigants as well. In Batson,
the Court noted that defendants are entitled to be tried by a jury that is selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86. Litigants have an interest in fair judicial
proceedings. Religious-based peremptory challenges cast doubt upon jury verdicts because the
neutrality of judicial proceedings is sacrificed due to discrimination. Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991) (reasoning that racial discrimination in the courtroom
"raises serious questions as to the fairness" ofjudicial proceedings); Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255,
259 (1986) (noting that preventing race-based peremptories protects a "defendant's interest in neutral
jury selection. . . [and] may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial.").
Religious-based peremptories also harm the community and the integrity of the judicial system.
The community is harmed because untested stereotypes regarding the ability of religious jurors are
reinforced by state actors. Cf J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994)
(asserting that gender-based peremptory challenges reinforce the stereotypes regarding the relative
abilities of men and women). Religious-based peremptories also undermine the public's confidence
in the judicial system. C. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (reasoning that
race-based peremptories undermine public confidence in judicial proceedings); Batson, 476 U.S. at
87 ("Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."). Although Batson and its progeny deal
primarily with racial discrimination, religious discrimination during jury selection also undermines
public confidence, especially because religion is an important aspect of many Americans' lives. See,
e.g., GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CAsTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION: AMERICAN FAITH IN THE
90's (1989); THE PERSISTENCE OF RELIGION (Andrew M. Greeley & Gregory Baum eds., 1973).
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
202. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425-26 (citations omitted).
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concerning race and gender, are often inaccurate.' 3
Consequently,
peremptory challenges exercised solely on steroetypes surrounding religious
affiliations are overbroad because excluded jurors may not personally adhere to
the teachings of their religious affiliation. ° Furthermore, when religiousbased peremptories are permitted, the government, through its state actors,
condones religious discrimination that the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA seek
to preclude. 5
In J.E.B., the Court emphasized that if voir dire was conducted properly,
additional information would enable litigants to exercise peremptories on
grounds other than "stereotypical and pejorative notions . . . . "
Voir dire
provides litigants a means of discovering juror biases 7 and serves as a
foundation for the intelligent use of peremptory challenges.'
However, voir
dire procedures often limit and restrict the amount of information gathered
during voir dire. The limited information gathered during voir dire often

203. See Casarezv. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140, at *31 n.15 (Dec.
14, 1994) (en bane) (noting that "although the Catholic Church condemns the use of artificial
contraceptives... 84% of the members of the Catholic Church believe catholics should be allowed
to use artificial contraceptives.") (citations omitted); Brenda D. Hofman, Political Theology: The
Role of OrganizedReligion in theAnti-Abortion Movement, 28 J. CHURCH & ST. 225,229-30 (1986)
(noting that many members of pro-life religious denominations are personally pro-choice); Samuel
A. Mills, Abortion and ReligiousFreedom: The Religious CoalitionforAbortion Rights (RCAR) and
the Pro-ChoiceMovement, 1973-1989, 33 J. CHURCH & ST. 569 (1991) (same); Shirley Salemy,
Ex-Episcopal Bishop Faces Heresy Trialfor Supporting Gays; Clergyman, 72, ForcesDebate Into
the Open, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1995, Metro §, at 3 (noting that although the Episcopal Church
opposes homosexuality, some of the Church's leaders condone homosexual lifestyles).
204. Religious-based peremptories are also underinclusive. "They are underinclusive insofar
as challenges on the basis of religious affiliation overlook nonreligious potential jurors who may hold
beliefs similar to those of a religious potential juror." Barton, supra note 86, at 210.
205. Cf J.E.B.v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 (1991) ("We shall not accept
as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'")
(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). For historical information illustrating why
the founders' desire for religious tolerance led to the passage of the Free Exercise Clause, see supra
note 189.
206. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
207. See supra note 4.
208. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602
(1976) (Brennan, J.,concurring) (reasoning that voir dire "facilitate[s] intelligent exercise of
peremptory challenges and [helps] uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for cause.");
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965) ("The voir dire in American trials tends to be
extensive and probing, operation as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories, and the process of
selecting a jury . ... "); United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1085 (5th Cir. 1991) (reasoning
that "voir dire . . . provide[s] defendants with the opportunity to make reasonable use of their
peremptory challenges."); United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 200 (10th Cir. 1977) ("Without
an adequate foundation [produced by voir dire], counsel cannot exercise sensitive and intelligent
peremptory challenges . . . ."); United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1977)
("Peremptory challenges are worthless if trial counsel is not afforded an opportunity to gain the
necessary information upon which to base such strikes."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
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encourages litigants to exercise peremptory challenges in a discriminatory
fashion.'
The combination of additional questions during voir dire once a
juror's religious affiliation is disclosed210 and attorney-conducted voir dire2 '
could curb the discriminatory effects of religious-based peremptory challenges
while securing the government's interest in providing litigants with an impartial
jury trial.
In general, trial court judges should require litigants to ask additional
questions during voir dire once a juror's religious affiliation is disclosed.212
Rather than allowing litigants to presume that certain individuals are unable to
serve as impartial jurors, judges should require a litigant's assumptions about
jurors' religious affiliations to be tested through voir dire. 213 One means of
testing litigants assumptions regarding jurors' religious affiliations is to require

209. One commentator has stated:
Because litigants do not know prospective jurors personally and are provided with only
limited information about the jurors during voir dire, they often have no choice but to
exercise peremptories on the basis of stereotypes. No doubt, absent limitations on the
use of peremptories, there is ample room for reliance on prejudices-negative biases
conceived independently of experience or reason ....
Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On
Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 837 (1989).
210. See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
212. A juror's religious preference is not a proper subject for inquiry during voir dire unless
the religious organization that the juror is associated with is directly related to the subject matter of
the suit, or if it can be shown that the jurors' religious preference will impair the juror's ability to
act objectively. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1993) ('Ordinarily at common
law, inquiry on voir dire into a juror's religious affiliation and beliefs is irrelevant and prejudicial,
and to ask such questions is improper.'), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); Hornsby v.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d
929 (Utah 1988); Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1977); Casey v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Baltimore, 143 A.2d 627 (Md. 1958).
However, neutral questions during voir dire may prompt jurors to disclose their religious
affiliations. See State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d 917 (N.C. 1994). In Eason, a juror disclosed his
religious affiliation in response to a neutral question regarding crime and punishment. Id. at 923.
See also Commonwealth v. Carleton, 629 N.E.2d 321, 327 n.10 (Mass. 1994) (noting that during
a colloquy with the judge, a prospective juror stated he was a Roman Catholic).
A juror's religious preference may also be discovered as a result of attorney research in
preparation for voir dire. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 45, at 183-89. The Government
can gather information about a juror's religious affiliations by using police officers and FBI
investigators on an "informal" basis. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 561 (1975). Regardless of how jurors' religious
affiliations are disclosed, rather than permitting litigants to simply exclude a juror solely because
they are religious, judges should require litigants to show how venirepersons' religious preferences
may make them undesirable.
213. J.Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-BasedPeremptory Challenges, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1920, 1934 (1992) (arguing that gender stereotypes should be tested with more questions
during voir dire).
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litigants to show a nexus between the jurors' religious faith and their ability to
serve as an impartial trier of fact.
A nexus requirement is similar to what courts employ when they determine
if a jurors' religious beliefs will prevent them from recommending a death
penalty sentence regardless of the facts of the case. In Wainwright v. Witt, 21'4
the Supreme Court held that potential jurors may be excused for cause when
their opposition to the death penalty due to personal or religious beliefs is such
that it would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties

as . . . juror[s] in accordance with [their]

instruction and . . . oath."215

Although the nexus requirement discussed in Wainwright dealt with challenges
for cause, a similar showing could be utilized to justify religious-based
peremptory challenges.
Instead of requiring litigants to show that a
venireperson's religious affiliation "substantially" impairs the ability to serve as
an impartial trier of fact, judges could require litigants to show that a juror's
religion would prevent impartiality.216 Therefore, so long as the judge could
determine that the explanation for the removal of a juror was reasonable in light
of the circumstances surrounding the case, even though the explanation did not
rise to the level for challenging a juror for cause, litigants would be able to
remove an undesirable juror.217 By forcing litigants to test their assumptions
about specific "religious" jurors, litigants will then be able to exercise their

214. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
215. Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). See also Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (reasoning that a juror who had moral beliefs against the death
penalty was properly removed for the cause).
216. For example, in a case involving an alleged violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994), the attorney general could not strike a Roman Catholic juror
on the sole account of the juror's religious affiliation, but might be able to do so if the attorney
general could show that the juror held religious beliefs opposed to abortion.
217. Cf. State v. Davis, 325 S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1989) (reasoning that when a potential juror has
religious reservations about the death penalty which are not so grave as to merit removal for cause,
the juror may be peremptorily removed). See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986)
(reasoning that a race-neutral explanation for the removal of African-American jurors need not rise
to the level justifying the exclusion of a juror for cause); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.
Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994) (reasoning that a gender-neutral explanation "need not rise to the level of a
'for cause' challenge . .
").
A nexus test would also avoid some of the complications surrounding the exercise of religiousbased peremptories. Although religious-based peremptories violate a jurors' rights, litigants should
not be required to offer a "religious-neutral" justification for peremptories that are challenged under
RFRA. Often it may be impossible for a litigant to justify the exclusion of a juror with religious
affiliations on a entirely "religious-neutral" ground. Instead, when religious-based peremptories are
challenged, litigants should be required at least to show a nexus between the juror's religious faith
and the juror's ability to act objectively. Upon a showing that a juror's religious faith is likely to
impair his or her ability to act impartially, the court should allow the juror to be excluded for cause
or for some level short of cause.
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limited number of peremptory challenges more effectively."
In addition to requiring litigants to further question jurors once their
religious affiliations are disclosed, attorneys could be allowed to conduct voir
dire rather than trial court judges. Efficiency concerns 219 and the fear that
lawyers will abuse the privilege by asking improper questions are reasons used
to justify the trend towards judge-conducted voir dire.'
However, when
judges conduct voir dire, the amount of information that is gathered is often
limited and the parties are encouraged to exercise peremptory challenges based

218. Effective voir dire procedures facilitate the intelligent use of peremptory challenges. See
supra note 208.
219. See Babcock,supra note 212, at 548.
The reason for the time savings isthat judges are neither inclined nor as able to ask the
appropriate next question when answers are evoked from the prospective jurors ....
This is true partly because the judge does not have the .. .advocate's awareness that
soon he will be making peremptory challenges based on inferences from what
prospective jurors have said, and partly because the judge does not know the case of
either party in detail, so that he cannot realize when responses have opened areas for
further inquiry.
Id.at548-49.
"If the judge asks the voir dire questions, the prospect is that the total selection time will be
drastically shortened." DR. JAMES RASICOT, JURY SELECTION, BODY LANGUAGE AND THE VISUAL
TRIAL 88 (1983).
Most studies conclude that judge-conductedvoir dire, rather than attorney-conductedvoir dire,
is more efficient. For example, one study revealed that federal judges take approximately 30
minutes to conduct voir dire. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 52 (1988). However,
statistics on a New York court proceeding indicate that attorney-conducted voir dire averages about
12.5 hours. Id. Nevertheless, other surveys suggest that there is little difference in the amount of
time for judge conducted voir dire versus attorney conducted voir dire. See VAN DYKE, supra note
45, at 165. In fact,
[s]urveys by the California Judicial Council in the early 1970s produced the seemingly
incongruous conclusion that judge-conducted voir dire in civil cases actually takes 2
minutes longer than attorney-conducted voir dire when the time for the pre- and postexamination conferences is included-as it must be if the real concern is time.
Id.at165 n.h.
Another study found that in federal civil cases judges took an average of 36 minutes to conduct
voir dire, while lawyers took approximately 45 minutes. Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case For
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges In Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227, 272-73
n.21 7 (1986).
220. In recent years, the trend is towards judge-conducted voir dire rather than allowing
litigants to question potential jurors. VAN DYKE, supra note 45, at 164. Proponents argue that
attorneys abuse their privilege because they:
frequently attempt to explain elements of their case in a sympathetic manner to the
prospective jurors or to influence the jurors on questions of law while they are trying
to establish 'rapport,' and it is this subtle indoctrination that has offended many judges
and commentators, who argue that such adversary arguments have no place in the juryselection phase and should wait until the trial actually begins.
Id. at165.
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upon discriminatory notions.2'1 Attorneys, rather than judges, are more likely
to ask questions that will enable them to effectively exercise peremptories
because attorneys typically understand the case in more detail than judges.'m
Thus, an attorney's familiarity with the case will encourage narrowly tailored
and focused questions aimed at revealing a venireperson's prejudices.'
Ideally, further questions will enable the litigants to obtain a sufficient amount
of information that will allow them to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges without having to rely on religious stereotypes that result in the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
The combination of additional questioning once ajuror's religious affiliation
is disclosed and attorney-conducted voir dire will lengthen the trial process.
Nevertheless, effective voir dire proceedings will help to disclose impartial
jurors.'
Furthermore, the general liberalization of voir dire may actually
save judicial resources in the long run. The liberalization of voir dire would
reduce the ability of a litigant to argue on appeal that the jury selection
procedures were unconstitutional due to the discriminatory use of religious-based

221. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
222. In fact, the Fifth Circuit has criticized the federal approach of judge-conductedvoir dire.
"The 'federal' practice of almost exclusive voir dire examination by the court does not take into
account that it is the parties, rather than the court, who have the full grasp of the nuances and the
strength and weaknesses of the case." United States v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 1980).
See aLso Babcock, supra note 212, at 548-49.
2723. See NATIONALJURY PROJECT, INC., JURYWORK: SYSTEMATICTECHNIQUEs, § 2.0513][b]
at 2-33 (Elissa Krauss & Beth Bonora eds., 2d. ed. 1995).
When judges conduct voir dire the questions asked to the jurors are often abstract and unlikely
to elicit useful responses. See Babcock, supra note 212, at 548. One commentator has used the
following example to illustrate the practical differences between judge-conducted and attorneyconducted voir dire.
[W]hen a potential juror responds that she has been the victim of a crime, the judge will
typically ask whether this would tend to prejudice her in evaluating the testimony to be
given in the case. An attorney conducting voir dire would probe the nature of the
crime, her evaluation of police investigation and conduct toward her, whether she made
an identification and testified in court. Such questions spring to the mind of the
advocate, but would occur less often to the judge.
Id. at 548-49.
224. See supra note 5. Furthermore, limited voir dire proceedings are unequally shouldered
by poor litigants that cannot afford adequate legal representation. See Babcock, supra note 212, at
558.
The poor litigant is left with the answers to a few short questions as the basis for
exercising his challenges. The wealthy makes his jury selection on much sounder
grounds. For a substantial fee, jury investigation services will compile dossiers on all
of the prospective jurors, including information such as party, church, social and other
affiliations, family configurations, employment records, and financial standing. Very
rich litigants eschew these services and hire their own investigators to find out even
more revealing information ....
Id. at 558-59.
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peremptories. For example, once a juror's religious affiliation is disclosed and
additional questions are asked regarding the juror's religious faith, information
will be gathered that either will permit a litigant to remove the juror for
causeW or will reveal that the litigant's stereotypes regarding the juror's
religious affiliation were invalid. Because litigants would be required to
question jurors beyond general religious affiliations, a party's ability to argue
that jurors' rights pursuant to RFRA were violated is substantially decreased.
Trial court records would show that jurors with religious affiliations were not
removed because they were religious, but were removed when it was revealed
that their religious faith impaired their ability to act impartially.'
The
increased amount of information resulting from voir dire not only aids the
litigants, 7 but protects jurors from being excluded solely on the basis of their
religious affiliations.'
VI. CONCLUSION

Batson and its progeny have substantially altered the traditional nature of
the peremptory challenge.'
In the future, the Supreme Court will likely
address the issue of whether to prohibit religious-based peremptory
challenges. '
Although the exercise of race-based and gender-based

225. Additionally, if the trial judge decides that not enough information has been gathered to
justify the removal of a juror for cause, litigants could still remove a juror pursuant to Baton's
rational of a heightened peremptory challenge. See supra note 217.
226. A nexus test would be a useful means to disclose a juror's biases and prejudices that stem
from his or her religious preference. For a discussion of the nexus test, see supra notes 213-17 and
accompanying text.
227. Extensive voir dire proceedings aid the litigants because additional information gathered
allows for the intelligent use of peremptory challenges. See supra note 208. See aLso note 4.
228. When litigants conform to RFRA's strict scrutiny standard, additional questions beyond
a juror's religious preference should be asked. Due to RFRA's strict scrutiny standard, the
government must secure an impartial jury trial through the least restrictive means available. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993).
Other less restrictive means exist to secure the
government's compelling interest in impartial jury trials rather than permitting the use of religiousbased peremptories. See supra notes 202-23 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 36-74 and accompanying text.
230. When the Court does address the issue of religious-based peremptory challenges, the issue
will likely divide the Court. The Court's decision to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges
caused controversy among many of the current Court's members. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Concurring in J.E.B., Justice O'Connor expressed concern about
the future of the peremptory challenge. Id. at 1431-32. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
have consistently opposed the erosion of the peremptory challenge. See, e.g., id. at 1434-35
(Rehnquist, 1., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court's decision to prohibit gender-based peremptories
places all peremptory challenges at risk); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court's continual erosion of the peremptory
challenge is unnecessary and impairs the ability of litigants to obtain an impartial jury); Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's holding
to prohibit defendants from exercising race-based peremptories, "while protecting jurors, leaves

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [1996], Art. 10

748

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

peremptory challenges has been limited according to the Equal Protection
Clause, the application of RFRA to jury selection procedures stands as a barrier
in opposition to religious-based peremptories. When state actors exclude jurors
solely due to their religious affiliations, the jurors' free exercise rights under
RFRA are violated." l In the future, courts must take greater notice of jurors'
free exercise rights secured by RFRA's strict scrutiny mandate when the validity
of religious-based peremptory challenges is analyzed.
Gary C. Furst

defendants with less means of protecting themselves.").
Nevertheless, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have suggested that after the Court's
decision in J.E.B., classifications based upon religion may also be unconstitutional. Justice Thomas
has stated:
In breaking the barrier between classifications that merit strict equal protection scrutiny
and those that receive what we have termed "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny,
J.E.B. would seem to have extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes
based on the latter category of classifications a category which presumably would
include classifications based on religion . . . . It is at least not obvious, given the
reasoning in J.E.B., why peremptory strikes based on religious affiliation would survive
equal protection analysis.
Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that religious-based
peremptories may fail intermediate scrutiny).
Although Justices Scalia and Thomas have asserted that religious-based peremptories may be
limited under the Equal Protection Clause's intermediate scrutiny standard, RFRA's strict scrutiny
standard forbids the exclusion of jurors solely on the account of their religious preference. See
supra notes 163-93 and accompanying text. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V. 1993)
(stating RFRA's strict scrutiny standard).
231. See supra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
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